Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World? by Conk, George W.
Volume 112 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 112, 
2007-2008 
6-1-2007 
Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World? 
George W. Conk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 DICK. L. REV. 175 (2007). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol112/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 




1. Introd uction ................................................................................................. 176
II. The Erosion and Persistence of Tort ........................................................... 182
A. Legislative First Reaction- ATSSSA ........................................................ 182
B. The Tort Alternative- Preserved ............................................................... 188
C. But What Were the Realistic Prospects for Recovery in Tort Had There
Been no September 11 Fund? How Far Does Duty Extend? .............. 189
D. W ill The 9/11 Victims Cases Go to Trial? ........................ .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. 191
III. Epidemic and Mass Tort Litigation at Ground Zero ................................. 198
A . D ust and D isease ........................................................................................ 198
B. The Ground Zero Workers Respiratory Injury Tort Claims ....................... 202
C. Familiar Ground: New York Labor Law § 241-Strict Liability for
Workers Doing Construction and Demolition Work ............................ 205
D. Civil Defense and Emergency Immunity ................................................... 207
1. Stafford A ct Im m unity ................................................................. 208
2. Defenses: Good Faith, Emergency and the SDEA ...................... 209
E. Aftermath of Judge Hellerstein's Decision to Allow the Ground Zero
Cases to Proceed: Special Masters-And an Expanded 9/11
V ictim s F und? ...................................................................................... 2 12
IV. The Second Wave-Federal Immunity for Products ................................ 217
A. The Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act ................................. 217
1. Liability Limitations and Compensation ...................................... 218
* Adjunct Professor, Fordham Law School; Elected Member, American Law
Institute; Member, ALl Consultative Group on the Restatement of Torts; Certified as a
Civil Trial Attorney by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
An earlier version on this paper was presented as the annual Raynes McCarty
Distinguished Health Law Lecture, at the Union League, Philadelphia, and Widener Law
School, October 11, 2006. Thanks are due to Raynes McCarty, P.C. and the Health Law
Institute at Widener for their sponsorship, to John G. Culhane and Andrew Newman,
Director and Associate Director of the Institute for the invitation, and to professors Jake
Barnes, Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, and Anthony Sebok for reviewing an earlier draft.
Thanks are also owed to Denise A. Rubin, Esq., and to the Office of the Corporation
Counsel, City of New York for providing me with briefs, transcripts, and other materials
from the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
2. The Impact of SEPPA on Tort Claims ......................................... 221
B. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 .............. 226
C. Counterpoint to PREPA-S. 2291-The Responsible Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act ........................................................ 232
D. W hom Should W e Compensate? ..................................... .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. 234
V. Historic Experience with Pandemic Flu Prophylaxis-The Swine Flu
Experience and the Federal Tort Claims Act ................................................... 236
A. Swine Flu Vaccine Product Liability Claims ............................................. 238
B. Hard Sell: The Federal Tort Claims Act-An Independent Basis for
Tort Liability of the United States Based on its Failure to Assure
Inform ed C onsent ................................................................................. 243
C. Bad Blood in Britain: What Is a Citizen Entitled to Expect About
Drug, Vaccine and Biological Product Safety? ..................... . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . 248
VI. Recap -A Regressive Trend ..................................................................... 251
VII. Where Do We Go From Here? Civil Recourse and a Common Vision
of T ort L aw ...................................................................................................... 255
I. Introduction
September 11, 2001 [9/11] changed everything, we are
hyperbolically and tediously told. Beyond the lives of the dead, the
injured, and their families, it created a general sense of emergency and
alarm. 9/11 undermined our sense of insulation and of national security.
It began a chain of reactions and overreactions.
The psychological,' material,2 and political consequences of the
attacks3 have generated massive literature. Today we look at a small but
important part of the story-the impact of 9/11 on provisions for civil
recourse by victims of harm. The security lapses were so patent that the
airlines and aircraft makers were on Capitol Hill pleading for protection
from negligence liability to victims on the ground within days of the
catastrophic assaults on our financial center in New York and our
military headquarters at the Pentagon.4 On November 19, 2001 Congress
1. JOEL B. EISEN, The Trajectory of "Normal" after 9/11: Trauma, Recovery and
Post-Traumatic SocietalAdaptation, 14 FORDHAM ENVT'L L.J. 499 (2003) (discussing the
complex and uncertain process of "post-traumatic societal adaptation").
2. GAO, RECENT ESTIMATES OF FISCAL IMPACT OF 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK ON
NEW YORK, REPORT OF MARCH 30,2005, GAO-05-269.
3. MARY L. DUDZIAK, ED., SEPTEMBER 1 1 IN HISTORY-A WATERSHED MOMENT?
(Mary L. Dudziak ed.) (2003).
4. To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation
system, and on the financial condition of the airline industry in the aftermath of the
events which occurred on Tuesday, September 11, 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2891, Before
the Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure. (Regarding liability protection, the
airlines are expected to propose that legislation be enacted to exempt the airlines' from
liability for damage to persons and property on the ground. This proposal would not
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established the "September 11, 2001 Victims Compensation Fund," an
elective remedy which required recipients to renounce any right of civil
action for redress-except against the terrorists and their allies. It was
the first of many restrictive measures embraced in Congress, with
proponents citing 9/11 as evidence of the need for immunities.
The short answer to the title question is: NO. Yet, tort law will
continue to be eroded by attrition, by lopping off remedies-especially
by limiting damages and expanding immunities-unless we are able to
grab hold of the public's conscience and consciousness to bring home the
point that liability in tort is not some form of punishment, erratically
inflicted.
Rather tort law is a highly elaborated body of thought. It asks what
constitutes socially unreasonable conduct and, by reasoned judgment,
allocates liability, and assigns responsibility. Tort shares that public
function with many institutions. But tort law is unique in that it is
essentially private law. The parties are not the public, nor strangers to
the controversy, but rather are the actors and victims themselves. As the
system has evolved two key elements should be observed: tort law
measures the conduct of all parties, allocating responsibility among
them, and it gages conduct in context. What is socially required is
determined, as we learn in the first semester of law school, by what
constitutes reasonable care under the particular circumstances.
9/11 did not change everything. It affirmed much. The upsurge of
public sympathy, the admiration for those who reported for duty as
rescuers and lost their lives underlined the principle that individual
recognition of the call of duty is the foundation of society. Underlying
the law of torts is the principle of respect for the interests of others as
equal to one's own. In the 1883 English case Heaven v. Pender5 a ship
painter fell to the dock due to a faulty rope. Lord Brett expressed the
concept of duty memorably:
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill
in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would
affect any existing rights of proper parties to bring claims against the airlines for all
compensatory and punitive damages for the experiences and deaths of the airlines'
passengers and crews), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpwl107-45.000/
hpw107-45_0f.htm, (last visited June 11, 2007). It is noteworthy that Hollis L. Harris,
testified on behalf of the National Air Carriers Association that airlines carried adequate
insurance for the loss of passengers, crew and planes. Their concerns centered on
potential liability for persons and property on the ground.
5. Heaven v. Pender, Trading as West India Graving Dock Company, 11 Q.B.D.
503 (1883).
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cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger .... 6
We look today at how that cloudless September day's terrible losses
have played out in legal responses to 9/11. Tort and compensation issues
immediately rose to prominence. The early stages of the story are
familiar. Shock and an outpouring of public sympathy and a desire to
help those who suffered in the catastrophe brought a huge wave of
charitable giving. Eleven days after the catastrophe came the first
legislative response- the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, (ATSSSA), which was quickly amended to add Title
IV which creates the September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of
2001.7 The Act created the Victims Compensation Fund for those who
died or were injured that day at the disaster sites in New York, the
Pentagon, and Pennsylvania and it brought liability protections for those
whose breaches of duty may have enabled the crimes that stunned the
nation and the world.8
At the site of the attacks in New York enormous effort followed-
first in the nearly fruitless search for survivors, then for the recovery of
remains of the dead, and finally in removal of the debris of the fallen
towers. In the wake of the catastrophe came labor, dust, and disease.
We are witnessing the unfolding of an epidemic of industrial disease that
evokes the historical epidemics of silicosis, 9 asbestosis, and cancer. The
stories of such epidemics are familiar. We learned them from such
physicians as Irving J. Selikoff to whom we can still hope a Nobel prize
in medicine will be posthumously awarded for his work in bringing an
end to the heedless use of the miracle mineral-asbestos.10
Today we are learning of the epidemic of industrial illness at
Ground Zero from Dr. Selikoff's successor at Mt. Sinai School of
Medicine in New York. Dr. Philip Landrigan informed us in 2002 that
the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 was not
only the worst assault on the American homeland in the 225-year history
of the United States:
It was also the most massive acute environmental disaster that ever
6. Id.
7. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, P.L. 107-42, 49 U.S.C.
§ A. 40101 (2006).
8. The point is to evoke the landmark article by Prof. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999).
9. DAVID ROSNER AND GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL DISEASE (1991).
10. BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS, 132 ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (Irving J. Selikoff, J. Churg, eds.) (1964); IRVING J. SELIKOFF AND DOUGLAS K.
LEE, ASBESTOS & DISEASE (1978).
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has befallen New York City. The destruction of the twin towers
released thousands of tons of toxic materials into the air of lower
Manhattan-asbestos, particulate matter, lead, soot, PCBs, and
dioxins. Workers and children were the groups at greatest risk of
exposure. The threat to human health was compounded in the
months after September 11 by the bioterrorist attacks involving
anthrax. "
Those two attacks-that of the suicide hijackers and the unknown
authors of the criminal distribution of powdered anthrax through the
mail-set the stage for the legislative responses that followed:
* the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund replaced tort
liability claims for immediate victims of the catastrophe. The
ATSSSA § 408 limited to available insurance the liability of the
airlines and the owners and operators of the airports through whose
security measures the conspirators passed without difficulty, and the
manufacturers of the aircraft the cockpits of which were so easily
commandeered. 12
* establishment of the World Trade Center Captive Insurance
Company. It provides $1 billion aggregate defense and excess
liability insurance to the City of New York and its contractors. 13 The
City took control of the WTC site and hired over 100 companies to
do the work of rescue, recovery, and debris removal. The City and its
contractors are defending respiratory disease cases brought by
thousands of policemen, firemen, and laborers who labored at
Ground Zero.
* the smallpox vaccination campaign and the liability limitations and
modest compensation scheme of the Smallpox Emergency Personnel
Protection Act of 2003 14
* the adoption of the government contractor defense for suppliers of
"qualified anti-terrorism technology" to the newly created
11. Philip J. Landrigan, Lessons Learned: Worker Health and Safe y Since
September 11, 2001, 42 AMERICAN J. IND. MED. 530-31 (2002).
12. The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), Chapter 1 "We Have Some Planes"; 49
U.S.C. § A. 40101.
13. 111 Stat. 517; WTC Captive Insurance Company, Inc., Liability Insurance
Policy (Occurrence Basis) (on file with author); 49 U.S.C. 40101 (capping liability of
City of New York at $350 million or its insurance coverage, whichever is greater).
14. P.L. 108-20, § 2, 117 Stat. 638; codified at 42 U.S.C. § 239, et seq. (2002); for a
critical review of the campaign see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON SMALLPOX
VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, THE SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM-
PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2005).
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Department of Homeland Security in the SAFETY Act of 200415
* the BioShield Act of 2004, which established a "strategic national
stockpile" of "drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical
devices, and other supplies" for use in the event of bioterrorist attack
or public health emergency.16
* the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005
(PREPA), which declares "targeted liability protections for pandemic
and epidemic products and security countermeasures." PREPA
abolishes tort liability except for cases of willful misconduct for the
producers and providers of products which are declared by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to be potentially useful in
emergency and are used in a period of declared emergency for the
purposes described in the protective "declaration." Though it echoes
the BioShield act, and describes its purposes as "targeted" liability
measures for pandemics and epidemics, it is not limited to materials
purchased for the "strategic stockpile" but rather extends its
protections to any designated product and any administrator in any
declared emer ency. Its compensation provisions track those of the
Smallpox Act. 7
* S. 2291, a bill introduced in the 10 9 th by the (then) Democratic
Senate minority's leadership to repeal the PREPA. It would create a
defense for a narrow class of medical products for which use is
permitted without completing the usual regulatory vetting, due to
their importance in a threatened emergency.
This article first discusses the ATSSSA. We review the strengths
and weaknesses of the tort claims of those who were injured and died on
9/11. The greatest concern of the airline and aircraft industry was
liability for persons and property on the ground, as was made clear in the
Congressional hearings held eight days after the attack. Though there
was fleeting reference to the allegedly wide variation in state common
law provisions, the real concern was that the air carriers, reeling from the
suspension of civil aviation and people's fear of flying, were not
adequately insured for the losses on the ground. Such contingent
liabilities were perceived as an obstacle to capital markets.
18
15. Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act, 2003, 6 U.S.C.
441, et seq. (2006).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)-(6)(b) (2006).
17. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, P.L. 109-148, Div
C, § 2, 119 Stat. 2818 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, et seq).
18. See September 19, 2001 hearings on H.R 2891, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, supra note 4.
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The September 11 Fund was a pressure-release valve designed in
significant part to relieve the distress of the air transportation industry.
Without the Fund, the uncertainties, delays, and costs of the tort litigation
against those whose inadequate security measures facilitated the crimes,
and the unpalatability of making airlines, aircraft manufacturers, and
airport operators bear the brunt of the cost of the tragedy might well have
led to dismissal of the 9/11 claims on grounds of lack of duty to the
ground victims or unforeseeability as occurred in the cases of the
Oklahoma City and the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. But leaving
the ground victims without remedy would have been equally unpalatable,
given the palpable sense of national unity and loss. Congressional action
sooner or later was a likelihood. In the actual event, almost all ground
victims accepted the 9/11 Fund awards. Those who did not elect to
accept 9/11 Fund awards are so few that the available insurance appears
to be adequate to satisfy any jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs. Had all
the ground victims joined in law suits with the passengers and others the
available insurance and assets of the airline industry defendants might
have been grossly insufficient had all the victims been left no other
recourse. Such ruin is not threatened by the actions of those who
spumed the Fund.
The opt-out claims have now been targeted for settlement by the
trial judge. Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein has now scheduled six bellwether
damages trials beginning September 2007. These trials will proceed
while liability discovery continues. The cases are intended to set
benchmark verdict values for victims of the 9/11 attacks.1 9
Next reviewed are the WTC respiratory injury occupational disease
tort claims, their necessity, and justice. We examine their vulnerability
in light of the immunity and lack of duty defenses raised. The Ground
Zero claims demonstrate the importance and vigor of the tort remedy.
The other post 9/11 liability-limiting legislative measures are also
19. Order scheduling damages trials, 21 MC 97 (AKH), (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007)
(This unusual procedure could produce low verdicts if, as trial lawyers' folklore
predicts, larger verdicts follow demonstration of a defendant's fault. But
according to a newspaper account at this essay went to press, other rulings -
such as allowing evidence of cockpit voice recordings on Flight 93 on which
passengers struggled to the death with the hijackers, knowing of their intentions
- impelled settlements. As of September 18 all but 21 cases had settled - for
undisclosed amounts. It appears that all the ground victims have settled. All of
the remaining open cases were claims by persons aboard the planes - whose
claims were always the strongest - as analyzed above. See Amona Hartocollis,
Settlements Do Not Deter 9/11 Plaintiffs Seeking Trial, NYTIMES.COM,
September 19, 2007).
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discussed. They provide broad protection for many classes of actors and
sellers, including administrators and producers of vaccines.
A survey of the historic experience with the Swine Flu vaccine
campaign of 1976 shows the centrality of familiar tort liability principles
of responsibility. In the Swine Flu vaccination campaign the federal
government stood in the shoes of vaccine manufacturers. The United
States admitted strict liability in tort for some vaccine complications
(such as confirmed paralytic Guillain Barre Syndrome), and fought other
claims.20 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States defended
its own "hard sell" of the Swine Flu vaccine. But liability was imposed
on the United States for the Centers for Disease Control's failure to
adequately inform citizens of vaccine risks.21
The British Hepatitis C-contaminated blood cases are discussed as
an instructive exemplar of government agency liability. There the
National Blood Authority was held accountable as collector and
distributor of blood products for its tardy implementation of an effective
test for viral contamination of donated blood.
The essay concludes with a call for a defense and revitalization of
tort-embracing the vision of tort as civil recourse crafted by my
Fordham colleague Benjamin Zipursky and his frequent collaborator
John Goldberg of Vanderbilt.
II. The Erosion and Persistence of Tort
A. Legislative First Reaction-A TSSA
The first legislative reaction was the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act.2 3 The "September 11 th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001 ,24 was a legislative expression of the enormous outpouring
of shock over the appalling attack and national sympathy for the victims
of the suicide attackers. Potential tort action defendants had immediately
sought to avoid liability for negligent operation of the security systems
evaded by the hijackers, for defects in the design of the readily overcome
cockpits, and for negligence in the management of the World Trade
Center where evacuation plans and routes proved deeply flawed. 5
20. See infra Section V.A.
21. See infra Section IV.B.
22. See infra Section IV.B.
23. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act is codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101, et seq. (2006) [hereinafter ATSSSA].
24. 49 U.S.C. 40101, section 401, et seq. of the ATSSSA.
25. Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September
11, 49 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 573-86 (2001); the claims ultimately brought are
described by Judge Hellerstein in In Re September 1 1th Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d
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The ATSSSA was unique. It paired a financially unlimited hybrid
no-fault social insurance fund with tort liability limitation measures: the
United States would compensate the immediate victims of the attack 26 on
an individualized basis-in exchange for giving up the right to make tort
claims (except against the attackers).2 7 And the Act limited the liability
of the airlines, manufacturers, and airport operators.
Though driven by sympathy and the desire for quick closure for the
families of the victims and the surviving injured victims themselves the
Fund (itself without a budgetary limit) had limits common to the
conventional tort reform agenda:28 collateral sources are credited against
the claims, non-economic loss was capped at $250,000 and $100,000
additional provided for death claims. There was no cap on the aggregate
payout. $7 billion was paid in toto to 2,880 claimants whose family
members died in the crashes or building collapses and to 2,680 persons
who suffered physical injury at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center
site.29
A tort-like narrow definition of physical injury was adopted by the
Special Master, Kenneth R. Feinberg, who enjoyed a unique status as
master of an autonomous federal administrative agency.3 ° Only claims
for bodily injury were recognized by Feinberg's office-and only for
those claimants who were treated within 72 hours of injury or rescue.
Thus those who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder without physical
injury or whose physical conditions manifested 31 later were excluded
under the Final Rule.
32
279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
26. ATSSSA § 403 afforded compensation "to any individual (or relatives of a
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001."
27. The Act provided for individualized, not categorical, damages for physical injury
and death. Elements included medical expenses, wage loss, "non-economic losses"
including "hedonic damages," and such damages as were permitted under state law (lex
loci delicti) for wrongful death. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq.
28. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS-THE BATTLE
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002) (describing four basic forms of anti-
litigation efforts: discouragement, management, replacement, and resistance, and
identifying workers compensation as the most significant of all anti-litigation reforms and
the September 11 Fund as the latest replacement reform).
29. Final Report of the Special Master, September II Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 [hereinafter Final Report].
30. Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 738 (2003) (victim compensation fund is a "marriage of
tort and social welfare principles" which "grafts a system of private law remedies onto a
program rooted in public law").
31. See, e.g. Metro North v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (Common law experience
teaches that fear of future cancer due to extensive inhalation of asbestos without
symptomatic or objective physical injury is not a cognizable injury under FELA).
32. Final Rule, September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104
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No fixed non-economic loss awards were set for the physical injury
claims, but awards in excess of $250,000 were by administrative fiat
reserved for "situations where a victim ultimately died after surviving for
days, weeks or even months after the tragedy.
'" 33
The Act provided for non-economic losses.34 Feinberg derived the
minimum presumptive award of $250,000 for each death from the
statutory federal benefits paid to the families of soldiers, police, and
firefighters who die in the line of duty.35 The Initial Final Rule
guaranteed an additional $50,000 for each dependent.36  In order to
accomplish some leveling of awards Feinberg set and then adjusted
categories of presumed economic and non-economic loss, doubling the
initial proposed presumptive non-economic loss to $100,000 for the
spouse and each dependent, in addition to the presumed $250,000 non-
economic loss for each death. Though this was not a cap the Special
Master thought consistency important and required special circumstances
be shown to depart from the norm. 37
The Special Master too saw the Fund principally as a response by
the nation to the trauma of the loss. But its tort-like provision for
compensation for each individual claim was contentious. Death claims
accounted for $5.99 billion of the $7 billion total claims paid. 43.5% of
that went to claimants whose deceased victims earned under $100,000.
30% went to families who had incomes in excess of $200,000.38 The
awards highlighted the distribution of wealth and income in our society
and led to recriminations by some who asked why they whose husband
or father, son, or daughter "died a hero" should receive a lesser award
than a stockbroker's family. The top presumed economic loss was set at
the 9 8th percentile of household income ($231,000), which actually
significantly lowered many awards. 39 But the presumed awards were not
true caps---each claimant was afforded the opportunity to be heard on
(2002) [hereinafter Final Rule].
33. Final Report supra note 29, at 9.
34. ATSSSA § 402 (9) defined non-economic broadly to include pain and suffering,
disfigurement, impairment, mental anguish, loss of society and consortium, hedonic
damages, injury to reputation and "all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature."
35. Final Report, supra note 29, at 40.
36. Statement of the Special Master, September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11233 (March 13, 2002), 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002).
37. 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2002) (The presumed non-economic losses for decedents
shall be $250,000 plus an additional $100,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the
deceased victim. Such presumed losses include a noneconomic component of
replacement services loss).
38. Final Report, supra note 29, at 52-56, 96 (the latter number referencing Table 2,
Distribution by Income).
39. Final Report, supra note 9, at 7-9.
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whether there should be a deviation from the presumed norm.4 °
The choices of the Special Master were understandable and prudent.
But they were nonetheless controversial because there was no clear
principle by which awards were determined, as George Priest 4' and John
Culhane have argued.42 The quest was not for full compensation tailored
40. 28 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2002) (Hearings shall be before the Special Master or his
designee. The objective of hearings shall be to permit the claimant to present information
or evidence that the claimant believes is necessary to a full understanding of the claim.
The claimant may request that the Special Master or his designee review any evidence
relevant to the determination of the award, including without limitation: Factors and
variables used in calculating economic loss; the identity of the victim's spouse and
dependents; the financial needs of the claimant; facts affecting noneconomic loss; and
any factual or legal arguments that the claimant contends should affect the award.).
41. George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 527 (2003) ("Awards under tort law are
constrained by the principle of awarding exactly the right amount. Recoveries under
private market insurance are constrained by the principle that a beneficiary receives only
what he or she has paid for. Benefits under government insurance or government welfare
programs are constrained by general governmental budgetary limits. In contrast, there is
no constraint on awards under the September 11 th Fund. Its budget is unlimited, and its
definitional principles vague. It is, therefore, not surprising that many victim families
have argued for larger awards. Finally, there is a second difference between awards
under our society's four compensation systems and awards under the Fund that is worthy
of notice. Our society's four compensation mechanisms are-in some form-
democratically defined. The common law derives from time immemorial; adjustments to
it-say, by the enactment of survivor's and wrongful death statutes-have been made by
democratically elected legislatures. Private market insurance is not democratic in a
political sense, but it derives from citizen choices and bears the legitimacy of any
allocation of resources determined under conditions of competition.").
42. John G. Culhane, What Does Justice Require for the Victims of Katrina and
September 11?, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 177-79 (2007) (Although this impulse (to
compensate) is understandable and perhaps even politically necessary, we should not
settle for the results of such a "practical" approach. In earlier works, I have argued for
separating the harms caused by social risks-those borne by everyone in a society, such
as terrorism and contagious diseases-from harms resulting from what might broadly be
called wrongful conduct.... Such separation is necessary because justice imposes
different requirements on compensation in the two cases. Inasmuch as social risks are
those shared by all, compensating those who suffer harm from them is constrained by the
requirements of distributive justice, which mandates that the needs and resources of the
entire society be taken into account. On the other hand, when injury is caused by a
private actor's fault-based conduct, the person harmed can call upon the full resources of
the culpable party for compensation. A particularly dramatic example of what can
happen when this division is insufficiently respected is the September II Victim
Compensation Fund. Driven by the need to do something for those whose family
members were killed by the tragic events of that day, Congress compensated those
afflicted by the terrorist attacks almost as fully as though it was compensating tort
victims. Payouts to aggrieved families went as high as $ 7 million, and the overall cost to
taxpayers-because the "fund" was such in name only-was just over $ 7 billion.
Singling out this class of victims for tort-like compensation served no principle of
distributional fairness. Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath stand in stark contrast.
Although the hurricane itself was not a preventable event, the devastation of New Orleans
could have been averted had government on all levels not failed miserably in a host of
ways: construction and maintenance of the levee system; 9 planning for evacuation; and
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to the individual case, nor to charge the full cost of the harm to the Fund
in lieu of the absent defendant tortfeasor (as a tort award traditionally
does under the common law rules of damages which ignore collateral
sources). Rather there was a sense of rough equity, informed by tort and
by legislative reference points (e.g. the use of the Public Service Officers
Benefit as a marker for non-economic loss, and the $250,000 statutory
cap on non-economic loss in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program).43
The Act stipulated that awards for non-economic and for economic
losses were subject to collateral source offsets. In fact total awards were
reduced $2,915,027,850 or 29% by collateral sources.44 This too led to
dissatisfactions: some complained that the collateral source offsets
mandated by the Act penalized those whose thrift benefited their
families.45 The Act defined collateral sources to mean "all" sources,
including "including life insurance, pension funds, death benefit
programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related
to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 .,,46 And
there was the divisive issue of whether charitable donations were to be
treated as collateral sources and deducted from proven losses (they were
not).
4 7
But consistent with the generous motivation he saw in the
legislation, and using the unique administrative discretion he possessed,48
Feinberg, in the final rule took a generous approach to the collateral
source deductions from demonstrable loss. All did not mean all. The
Special Master excluded life insurance proceeds that were distributed to
persons other than the beneficiaries of the Fund; used his discretion to
adjust the amount of offsets to exclude premiums or assets that were
communication and rapid-response efforts once evacuation became necessary. Yet the
federal government has come up with no compensation system on the order of the Victim
Compensation Fund, even though the federal government's fault is clear and perhaps
even conceded in this case.).
43. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, P.L. 99-660 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(aa)-10, et seq. (2002).
44. Final Report, supra note 29, at 9.
45. Id. at 10-13.
46. ATSSSA § 402 (6).
47. See Final Report of Special Master, supra note 29.
48. Diller, supra note 30, at 767 (Feinberg's conduct highlights the central weakness
of the Fund as an administrative mechanism-its operation rests on the personal choices
of a single individual, with little means of accountability or oversight. As Feinberg has
construed his grant of authority, there are few governing legal standards, no real
requirement that claims be treated alike, no obligation to provide reasoned explanations,
no limits on the amount that may be spent, and no means of judicial review. It is difficult
to conclude that the Fund constitutes a responsible administrative mechanism for
dispensing billions in public funds however wise and solomonic Feinberg's judgments
may be.).
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accumulated by the victim through self-contributions paid into a life
insurance program to build up a tax-deferred cash value; and reduced the
amount of the offset for a pension to take account of self-contributions to
that plan over the decedent's lifetime.49 In addition, the final rule
provided that tax benefits received from the federal government as a
result of the enactment of the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of
2001 would not be treated as collateral source compensation.5"
In the end, the average award was $1,000,000-and that was
completed far faster than tort litigation would have delivered that result.
51
And far more cheaply because it was not only a non-adversarial process
but the bulk of the lawyers who handled the claims did so without fee
through the Trial Lawyers Care program.52 Even those who handled the
case for a fee took reduced fees which were examined carefully by
courts.53  And, it bears noting, the Special Master and his law firm
worked 19,000 hours without fee.54
Because filing of a fund claim constituted waiver of the right to sue
the airlines, aircraft manufacturers, or airport operators and sponsors,55
the September 11 Fund was discussed, especially at the time of passage,
as a way of saving the airlines, manufacturers, and airport operators from
crushing liability arising from inadequate cockpit security design and
poor airport screening. But such problems could have been addressed by
liability caps, or by limiting claims to existing insurance policy limits. It
seems likely then that the driving force behind the fund was our tidal
wave of sympathy, the desire to see victims' and their families' needs
met with dispatch, rather than be subjected to the delays and
49. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2002).
50. Final Rule, Statement by the Special Master, 67 Fed. Reg 11233, 11241 (March
13, 2002) ("The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 [P.L. 107- 134] provides
income and estate tax relief to the families of victims of terrorism .... [I]t waives the
income tax liability of a victim who died in one of the attacks for both the year of the
attack and the previous year, and ensures that a minimum benefit of $10,000 is provided
to the family of each victim ... that relief will not be treated as collateral source
compensation for purposes of determining awards from the Fund.").
51. The final deadline for submission of claims was December 23, 2003. Claims
were processed quickly and the Final Report of the Special Master issued in November
2004.
52. See THE ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THOUSANDS OF
HEROES-THE REST OF US COULD ONLY HELP, REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004) available at
http://www.atla.org/homepage/TLC.aspx (describing the work of ATLA's Trial Lawyers
Care project and 1,100 attorneys' pro bono work on behalf of 1,700 families).
53. See, e.g. Estate of Gomez, 785 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2004) (The Bronx County
Surrogate carefully scrutinized fee applications and required submission of detailed
affidavits of service of contingent fees ranging from zero to 10%.).
54. Final Report, supra note 29, at 114.
55. ATSSSA § 405 (c)(3)(B)(I).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
uncertainties of litigation, as Professor Robert Rabin has suggested.56
B. The Tort Alternative-Preserved
If Congress had not created the September 11 Fund and the families
of the victims were dependent on pending tort litigation, and the aviation
defendants and their insurers were bearing the full burden of litigation
and satisfaction of any judgments public sentiment would have put
enormous pressure on the litigants and the court. It is not possible to say
how the courts would have responded under the klieg lights that would
have been on every aspect of the cases. But ordinary experience tells us
that systems break under great pressure.
The compensatory purpose of the September 11 Fund seems to have
been well served. But compared to what? It appears on the surface that
United and American airlines, the aircraft manufacturer Boeing, and the
airport security companies and operators have saved $6 billion. Perhaps
more-given that one can readily imagine huge pain and suffering
awards-especially for those at or above the points of impact of the jets,
where many jumped to their deaths to escape the inferno.
Congress preserved an optional tort remedy. It created an exclusive
federal tort cause of action for all damages claims arising from the
September 11 hijackings with the substantive law (including choices of
law) drawn from the law of New York or other crash locations (except to
the extent "inconsistent with or preempted" by federal law), limited
recoveries to insurance available,57 and set venue in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.58 Seventy who
declined to make claims to the Fund and ten businesses have filed suit
there. The actions are pending before Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, who
has taken on the monumental job of managing the September 11
litigation. Cases involving claims arising out of, resulting from, or
56. Rabin, CLEVELAND STATE, supra 25, at 576 (There is no reason to think that
members of Congress, who endorsed the Fund with acclaim just two weeks after the
event, at the high tide of emotional response to September 11, were immune to these
sentiments. In short, the Fund was created under singular circumstances. Rather than
reflecting a political trade-off designed to quell workplace unrest (black lung, workers'
compensation), or to provide liability assurances to an industry (vaccine, Price-
Anderson), the Fund was conceived at least in part as a grant of largess to the survivors of
those who had unwittingly served as surrogates, stand-ins, for the rest of the American
people.).
57. The liability of New York City was limited to available insurance or
$350,000,000, whichever is greater. Through the Captive Insurance Company there is
$1,000,000 available to the City and its contractors, which coverage is above the Lloyds'
coverage for the Ground Zero workers' claims. See Captive Insurance Policy, infra note
122.
58. ATSSSA § 408 (b).
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relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 and
naming as defendants an airline, an airport security company, and/or The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have been consolidated for
discovery and other pre-trial proceedings before Judge Hellerstein. They
include: (i) In re September 11 Litigation, 21 MC 97 (AKH), claims
brought by passengers and ground victims of the September 11 attacks;
(ii) In re September 11 Litigation, 21 MC 101 (AKE), claims brought by
property owners whose property was damaged as a result of the
September 11 attacks; (iii) In re World Trade Center Disaster Site
Litigation, 21 MC 100 (AKH), claims brought by those who came to the
World Trade Center disaster site to assist with the debris removal effort
following the September 11 attacks; (iv) In re World Trade Center
Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH), claims brought by those
who assisted with the debris removal effort at sites other than the WTC
site following the September 11 attacks.
C. What Were the Realistic Prospects for Recovery in Tort Had There
Been No September 1] Fund? How Far Does Duty Extend?
Would the 9/11 plaintiffs have met the same fate as the claims of
victims of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing who sued the manufacturers
of the fertilizers weaponized by Timothy McVeigh? The question is
particularly acute for the ground victims-because their victimization
was a more remote contingency than was the death of a passenger on a
hijacked airplane. The Oklahoma City victims and families, like the Port
Authority as landowner in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing cases,
brought product liability cases against the manufacturers of the
ammonium nitrate used in the truck bombs. The plaintiffs alleged a
design defect in the "explosive grade" fertilizer used by McVeigh. The
Oklahoma claims were dismissed as a matter of law by the 10 th Circuit in
Gaines v. ICI, as the court held that the plaintiffs could not establish
proximate cause.5 9 In doing this, the Court of Appeals relied on the
Restatement of Torts, 2d. Its black letter rule declares the criminal act of
a third person to be a superseding cause unless the defendant had reason
to foresee the criminal act:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is
a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although
the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an
opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless
the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have
realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and
59. Gaines v. ICI, 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998).
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that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit
such a tort or crime.
60
The 1 0 th Circuit Court of Appeals noted particularly Comment b. of
§ 448, which discusses:
situations which are commonly recognized as affording temptations
to which a recognizable percentage of humanity is likely to yield. So
too, there are situations which create temptations to which no
considerable percentage of ordinary mankind is likely to yield but
which, if they are created at a place where persons of peculiarly
vicious type are likely to be, should be recognized as likely to lead to
the commission of fairly definite types of crime.
6 1
But the precursors pointed to by plaintiffs as signals of foreseeable
risk-the bombing of the Army Mathematics Research Center in
Madison, Wisconsin by an anti-war extremist in 1970, and the attacks by
the IRA and other guerillas in the U.K. and Europe-were found by the
Court of Appeals to be too remote from "the test of common experience"
to be a proximate cause. 62 The 10th Circuit treated the victims in the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building like Mrs. Bolton who unfortunately
stepped outside her house at the moment a slugger at the cricket pitch
across the lane launched a rare long ball, injuring her seriously. Mrs.
Bolton was the blameless victim of an event so unlikely to cause injury
that no liability was found by the House of Lords in the tort law classic
Bolton v. Stone.63 The Oklahoma City case was barred, said the Court of
Appeals, by the Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 302B, which states "Even
where there is a recognizable possibility of the intentional interference,
the possibility may be so slight, or there may be so slight a risk of
foreseeable harm to another as a result of the interference, that a
reasonable man in the position of the actor would disregard it.
64
A similar conclusion, more conventionally and securely grounded in
the concept of duty, was reached 10 months later by the Third Circuit in
an action by the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey against the
manufacturers of the ingredients in the 1993 truck bombing of the World
Trade Center. Like the Oklahoma City defendants, the defendant
manufacturers sued by the Port Authority, the Port Authority moved
under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
In Port Authority v. Arcadian, the court accepted arguendo the
allegations in the complaint-that ammonium nitrate prills could be
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1977). (Emph. added)
61. Gaines v. ICI, 160 F.3d at 620-21.
62. Id. at 620.
63. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, cmt. D (1977).
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rendered non-detonable, and that European manufacturers were required
by law to render their ammonium nitrate products non-detonable. The
American manufacturers' failure to do so was alleged to render their
products defective.65
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia, finding no significant
differences between the law of New York and that of New Jersey-the
locale of the rental of the truck and the assembly of the bomb-held that
the fertilizer manufacturer had "no duty to prevent a criminal misuse of
their products which is entirely foreign to the purpose for which the
product was intended." Even if the misuse of the product was
foreseeable it was not an "objectively foreseeable" alteration and no duty
arose on the part of the manufacturer, according to the majority.6 6
But Circuit Judge Hoeveler, while concurring, declared in a separate
opinion
I am, however, constrained to offer an observation which may bear
the fruit of protection from further similar disasters. The precedential
value of our decision, as well as that of the Tenth Circuit in Gaines-
Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998),
rests largely on a slender and temporal reed: lack offoreseeability
of the intervening criminal act. Whether experience and failure to
use available safeguards will, in time, create new legal duties on the
part of the manufacturer remains to be seen. We live in a society in
which the disgruntled more and more resort to violence. Appellees'
products, so easily convertible to dangerous qualities, need not-with
proper treatment-become a part of that violence.
67
So far that slender and temporal reed has not barred the actions of
those who declined the opportunity to take the ATSSSA's § 405 no-fault
benefits, but rather elected the tort option.
D. Will the 9/11 Victims Cases Go to Trial?
The few (about seventy) who declined to make claims from the
victims' compensation fund have sought relief in a traditional tort
remedy with trial by jury. Their complaints alleged that United and
American airlines, airport security companies, and airport operators
failed to fulfill their security responsibilities. The Port Authority is
65. Port Auth. v. Arcadian, 189 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 314-15.
67. Id. at 321 (emphasis added). It is not clear that plaintiffs' (and Judge Hoeveler)
were correct regarding the technology. A later report by the National Academy of
Sciences found substantial doubt about the technology to render ammonium nitrate non-
detonable. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONTAINING THE THREAT FROM ILLEGAL
BOMBING (1998).
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alleged to have negligently constructed, designed, and managed the
buildings, and to have failed, even after the 1993 truck bombing, to
provide safe evacuation routes and plans. Boeing, the manufacturer of
the commandeered aircraft is alleged to have defectively designed the
cockpit doors because they were not designed to prevent forced entry.68
Judge Hellerstein rejected the aviation defendants' F.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.69 His
comprehensive opinion rejected the aviation defendants' argument that
they owed no duty to the ground victims and others because it was
"beyond the scope of any foreseeable duty owed.,
70
But subsequent developments in the law of duty in New York cast
doubt on whether Hellerstein's prediction that New York law extending
duty to the ground victims and passengers will withstand appeal if the
cases are not settled. ATSSSA § 408 makes New York law the
substantive law of the WTC tort claims.7' Judge Hellerstein, quoting the
1987 New York Court of Appeals decision in D'Amico v. Christie,72
correctly notes that New York has been "cautious in extending liability
to defendants for their failure to control the conduct of others 'even
where as a practical matter [the] defendant can exercise such control."'
73
Such an attitude by the New York high court may yet doom the claims of
the ground victims.
This conservative stance on the imposition of a duty is vigorously
embraced again by the New York Court of Appeals in the 2005 case
Holdampf v. Port Authority.74 The New York high court's decision
contrasts with the thinking of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 2005
case Olivo v. Exxon.75 In each case a worker's wife developed the lethal
asbestos-related cancer mesothelioma from laundering her husband's
asbestos dust-laden work clothing. The New Jersey Supreme Court
allowed the claim. It noted that as early as 1916 industrial hygienists had
warned of the dangers of bringing asbestos contaminants home in work
68. In Re World Trade Center Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
69. Id. (Among the plaintiffs are ten businesses that sustained property damage.
Hellerstein also rejected the Port Authority's motion to dismiss.). Plaintiffs alleged that
fire suppression and escape systems at the World Trade Center were negligently designed
and operated. Id. at 302-06.
70. Id. at 290-94.
71. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002).
72. D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76 (N.Y. 1987) (stating that employer did not
owe duty to victim of intoxicated employee who had been ordered to leave premises and
then drove car while intoxicated).
73. Id.
74. Holdampf v. AC&S and Port Auth., 5 N.Y.3d 486 (2005) (citing Hamilton v.
Beretta, 96 N.Y.2d 222 (2001)).
75. Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 (N.J. 2006).
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clothing. The Jersey justices declared "the duty we recognize in these
circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm to
plaintiffs wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household chores
that would include laundering the work clothes worn by her husband.,
76
But the New York high court, citing Palsgraf v. LIRR Co.,
77
declared foreseeability to be relevant only if it found a duty of care was
owed. The New York court found none, overturned the decisions below
and dismissed the case.78 The Port Authority, whether as employer or
land owner, had no duty because it had no special relationship with its
employee's wife. 79 The court feared creating "limitless liability to an
indeterminate class of persons conceivably injured" by imposing a duty
on employers for negligent acts toward such a person as the spouse of an
employee.8 °  Citing its refusal to impose liability on gun sellers for
criminal acts by remote gun owners the New York high court
emphasized that "any extension of the scope of duty must be tailored to
reflect accurately the extent that its social benefits outweigh its costs.
' 81
If the federal court of Appeals in New York faced the question on
appeal from Judge Hellerstein's courtroom, the circuit judges might well
decide that New York would conclude that the costs outweighed the
social benefits of imposing a duty on the airlines and aircraft
manufacturers to control the actions of the terrorists. If no September 1 1
Fund had been established there are significant doubts that the tort claims
would have survived appeal and doubt that settlements (or awards paid)
would even have equaled what the Special Master doled out.
The September 11 Fund paid out $7 billion in three years.82 The
rough guess liability insurance exposure for the seventy 9/11 plaintiffs-
based on average payouts of $2-4 million per claim in commercial
aviation accidents-is estimated to be $3.5 billion for United and
American Airlines and $4 billion for other aviation defendants, according
to a Rand Institute report.83 If Congress had not enacted the ATSSSA
bankruptcy filings might have limited the litigation to the proceeds of the
available insurance, which may well have created pressures on Congress
to then enact something like the September 11 fund. It takes little
imagination to look back to the future to say that national sentiment for
76. Id. 404.
77. Palsgrafv. LIRR Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
78. See Holdampf, 5 N.Y.3d at 498.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 493.
81. Id.
82. Final Report, supra note 29, at 1.
83. Lloyd Dixon and Rachel Kaganoff Stem, The Rand Institute for civil Justice,
Compensation for Losses from the 9/11 Attacks, Rand Institute for Civil Justice 59-60
(2004).
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the bereaved families of the 9/11 victims would have been impatient with
the glacial pace of litigation. Of course charitable outpouring was great,
but such sentiment also invites action by elected officials. And the
claims of these particular widows and orphans, languishing in litigation,
the stuff of tabloid headlines and evening news profiles and laments,
would certainly have invited action by elected representatives. In the
actual event, Congress did place limits on the claims of 9/11 victims.
ATSSSA § 408 limited recovery to insurance in place on September 11,
2001 "for all claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages or
for contribution or indemnity, arising from the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001, against an air carrier, aircraft
manufacturer, airport sponsor, or person [with a property interest in the
World Trade Center]. 84
The relative handful of 9/11 Fund opt-out cases are now headed to
trial and jury verdict-as did the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
cases against the Port Authority which came to trial in 2005.85 The New
York Supreme Court allowed the lawsuits by those who in 1993 suffered
physical and economic injury to proceed against the Port Authority. The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as landlord did not have
governmental immunity under the act creating the bi-state agency.86
Relying on New York precedent, Justice Stanley L. Sklar ruled that
"[w]here ambient crime has infiltrated a landlord's premises, or where
the landlord is otherwise on notice of a serious risk of such infiltration,
the landlord's duty to protect arises." The trial judge found "[t]he
predicted scenario, eerily accurate, in the Port Authority's (pre-1993
bombing) security reports, of a vehicle bomb in the garage, and the
evidence of bomb threats in the complex, [is] sufficiently similar in
nature to the [1993 truck] bombing to raise a triable issue as to
foreseeability." The Appellate Division affirmed on the opinion below
87and the cases headed to a jury.
The Port Authority's claim that such an attack was so remote as to
be unforeseeable was rejected because it was burdened by the spurned
84. See 49 U.S.C. §A. 40101 (2006)
85. World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. Steering Comm. v. Port Auth., 2004 N.Y. App.
Div. LEXIS 14720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
86. The legislatures of New York and New Jersey enacted statutes with identical
provisions pursuant to which the Port Authority waived its sovereign immunity to tort
claims. See N.J.S.A. §§ 32:1-162; N.Y. McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws § 71061, et
seq. (McKinney 2007) (providing "Although the Port Authority is engaged in the
performance of governmental functions, the said two States consent to liability on the
part of the Port Authority in such suits, actions or proceedings for tortious acts committed
by it and its agents to the same extent as though it were a private corporation.").
87. In re World Trade Center Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S. 2d 713, 735 (NY County
Sup. Ct. 2004), aff'd in In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig. Steering Comm. v. The
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 784 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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study of the Port Authority's own Office of Special Projects (OSP)
which traveled to London to study how the police there dealt with
terrorism by the IRA and others. The OSP reported to Port Authority
management what would become the refrain in the opening argument of
the plaintiffs trial attorney, David Dean, a trial lawyer from central
casting: the authorities at Scotland Yard told Port Authority officials in
August 1984 that they were "appalled to hear we had transient parking
directly underneath the towers. 88
At trial in October 2005 the plaintiffs prevailed. The New York
County jury by a 6-0 vote found that the Port Authority "was negligent
by not maintaining the World Trade Center's parking garage in a
reasonably safe condition on February 26, 1993." Apportioning liability
"between defendant Port Authority and the bombers" the jury 6-0
attributed 68% to the Port Authority and 32% to "The Bombers." But on
the final question-whether the Port Authority acted with "reckless
disregard"-the jury reported an "impasse," with two in favor of the
finding and four opposed. The most remarkable finding is the attribution
of only 32% of the fault to "The Bombers." 89 This vote demonstrates the
normative appeal of the enabling tort. As David Dean said to the jury in
his opening argument "it was a terrorist's dream. Scotland Yard was
appalled." 90
Thanks to the work of government agents, such as John O'Neill, the
FBI operative, and Richard Clarke, the National Security Council
adviser, the government intelligence system was "blinking red" in the
summer of 2001. But there does not appear to be a "Bin Laden
determined to attack U.S." memo, or an OSP Scotland Yard alarum
smoking gun pointing at the airlines, at Boeing, or at the airport
operators.
9 1
Nonetheless when the 9/11 tort cases against the aviation defendants
reach trial there will be a mound of evidence, echoing the 9/11
Commission Report, that passenger pre-screening, checkpoint screening,
and onboard security were "seriously flawed." And there will be grim
accounts showing that despite the "warning" of 1993, the World Trade
Center evacuation plans, protocols, training, and instruction were grossly
inadequate, and that the narrow stairways, radio failures, and
88. Id. at 719.
89. In the Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Litigation, Index No. 600000/94
(jury interrogatory sheet on file with author).
90. Interview with David Dean, Esq., Senior Trial Attorney, Sullivan Papain Block
McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., in New York City (January 2006).
91. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 259 (2005).
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communication problems at the towers cost many lives.
92
When trial is reached much of the political pressure discussed above
will not be present. All qualifying 9/11 victims--except the few
plaintiffs-have accepted the compensation offered by the September 11
Victims Compensation Fund.93 The ATSSSA's limitation of liability to
insurance in place on 9/11 relieves the court (and jury if they learn of
it-this being the age of Google, after all) of the prospect of helping to
drive airlines and aircraft manufacturers into financial ruin. In such a
circumstance it will be easier to focus on the fault of the airlines, of the
security personnel, and of Boeing. Because of the aggregate damages
limits and the compensation of Fund claimants, pressure to reject the
imposition of tort liability by the retributive principle will be less
compelling. No great disproportion between wrong and harm will be
posed by the imposition of liability on the insured defendant
manufacturers, airlines, airports, and landlord.
We are accustomed to thinking of retribution as a limiting principle
in criminal law-let the punishment fit the crime.94 But the principle
also has vitality in the civil liability setting for non-intentional torts. This
issue is given to the jury for comprehension within the proximate cause
determination, that there must be a "reasonably close causal connection
between the conduct and the resulting injury" between the breach and the
harm, as Prosser put it in his famous summary of the elements of the tort
of negligence.95 Similarly in New York, a jury is told that the wrong
92. See id. at 83.
93. John G. Culhane, Torts, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1027 (2005) (The plan itself is better described as social insurance scheme, rather
than a tort-replacement plan. Because the government, not the actors, was the payor but
not the wrongdoers' insurer the provision of roughly full compensation for economic
losses is not a corrective justice measure [restoring the status quo ante]. The scheme,
which replicated the existing inequitable distribution of wealth, is unjustified on
distributive justice grounds. A scheme which provided equal benefits to each victim or
the survivors would have met distributive justice concerns.).
94. The limitation reaches back to the Magna Carta, as the California Supreme
Court's recent discussion of punitive damages reminded us. The Charter Magna Carta
limited civil sanction, providing that a wrongdoer may be "amerced ... saving his
wainnage"--that is, saving the means which permit him to carry on husbandry, including
his "wain"-his wagon and other tools and means. See Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d
1348, 1352-53 (Cal. App. 1991) ("A freeman shall only be amerced for a small offence
according to the measure of that offence. And for a great offence he shall be amerced
according to the magnitude of the offence, saving his contentment; and a merchant, in the
same way, saving his merchandize. And a villain, in the same way, if he fall under our
mercy, shall be amerced saving his wainnage." (quoting Magna Carta (1215))).
Consideration of the defendant's financial condition is relevant to ensure that the amount
of punitive damages is sufficient to punish and deter, but not so great as to cause financial
ruin. See, e.g. Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J.
1993).
95. WILLiAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS, § 35 (2d ed. 1955).
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must be a "substantial factor," one that reasonable persons would regard
as a cause and not a "slight or trivial" factor.
96
The requirement of a reasonable relationship between fault and the
burden of making good the harm inflicted is also expressed in the
concept of intervening cause. In New York the jury is instructed, "If you
find that a reasonably prudent person would not have foreseen an act of
the kind committed by (the attackers) as a probable consequence of the
defendant's negligence, then the defendant is not responsible for the
plaintiffs injuries and plaintiff may not recover." 97 The 9/11 plaintiffs
have the 1993 truck bombing to point to as indicator of risk of terrorist
attack on the WTC in particular. The defense of intervening cause seems
unlikely to be the basis for a ruling as a matter of law because the
"slender and temporal reed" of which Judge Hoeveler spoke concerns the
foreseeability of attack which negates the "intervening cause" defense.
The jury verdict in the 1993 WTC bombing case shows that the obstacle
can be overcome by plaintiffs.
Where, as here, there is insurance available to cover the cost and to
limit the weight of the burden shifted, New York courts (and therefore
the Southern District applying New York law) may be less inclined to
use the concept of duty to avoid liability for the claims of those on the
ground on 9/11 and would likely allow the tort claims to proceed. The
legislated aggregate cap on damages at insurance coverage limits is a
sum-certain surrogate for the limits imposed by the retributive principle
of justice. Although the availability of insurance is considered
potentially prejudicial to the defendants, and its existence is routinely not
disclosed to the jury, the availability of insurance coverage is a routine
consideration for the court in determining duty, e.g. whether to impose
strict liability, particularly in "strict" product liability cases. 98
The 9/11 ground victims and passengers tort actions, brought by
those who have foregone the opportunity for no-fault compensation
presents the opportunity for the civic judgments to be made that underlie
the appeal and importance of the law of torts: first, assessment of
whether the actors (both the aviation defendants and the managers of the
WTC) took sufficient account of the interests of others-those in the
planes and those on the ground-in their conduct; and second, requiring
96. N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr., Civil 2:70.
97. N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr., Civil 2:72.
98. For example, note "insurance availability," the 7th and final item in the list of
risk-utility factors cataloged by Dean John Wade to guide courts determinations of
whether to impose "strict liability in tort" in product liability cases. John W. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)
(Although the "risk utility" factors are commonly the core of jury instructions on product
defect, their original formulation by Wade was commended to courts as factors for
consideration on whether to impose strict liability in tort on product sellers.).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
them to bear the costs that their wrongful conduct imposed on others
(within legislated limits which function as limits imposed by the
retributive principle).
As a sympathizer with the impulse to compensate fully and quickly
the victims and the families of the victims of September 11, 2001, I will
not engage in the substantial debate about whether it can or should be
replicated (though both seem doubtful). The Fund's awards for pain and
suffering, and the legislative commitment to approximately full repair of
economic loss (collateral sources excepted) created ambiguity about
whether it was providing social insurance or liability insurance. The
Fund and the Special Master, by some alchemy of transference, came to
stand for the tortfeasors. The struggles with claimants which the Special
Master has described in his Final Report suggest that the proposed
awards were viewed by many of the aggrieved not as the nation's
extraordinary response to tragedy, but rather as the kind of metaphor of
judgment of wrongdoing and repair of loss that tort verdicts symbolize.
It may be nonetheless that despite, or because of, its doctrinal
impurity, the ATSSSA's combination of no-fault social insurance
compensation with an optional and limited tort remedy will prove itself
to have been a very judicious choice-one which will bring closure,
compensation and social, moral tort judgment under tragic
circumstances.
III. Epidemic and Mass Tort Litigation at Ground Zero
A. Dust and Disease
In the days following the attacks, officials were eager to reassure the
public and to hasten a return to normalcy. An early concern was the
hazard presented by the smoldering ruins of the World Trade Center.
Environmental testing began quickly but no one had ever tested a toxic
mix such as the pulverized towers presented. Hasty assurances were
offered-most notoriously by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator Christine Todd Whitman. The former Governor of
New Jersey made statements so broadly reassuring that United States
District Judge Deborah Batts concluded that Whitman did not establish
the defense of qualified immunity because
(n)o reasonable person would have thought that telling thousands of
people that it was safe to return to Lower Manhattan, while knowing
that such return could pose long-term health risks and other dire
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consequences, was conduct sanctioned by our laws.
99
There was much to regret. A report by the Office of the Inspector
General of the EPA (OIG) 00 concludes that
EPA's early public statements following the collapse of the WTC
towers reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside the
Ground Zero area. However, when EPA made a September 18
announcement that the air was "safe" to breathe, it did not have
sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket statement.
°10
The OIG recounts that EPA failed to "assert its opinion and
judgment on matters that impact human health and the environment."
0 2
White House Council on Economic Quality vetting of EPA press releases
had led to ill-considered down-playing of health risks by the EPA. For
example one draft EPA press release said
Recent samples of dust gathered by OSHA... show higher levels of
asbestos. Seven debris and dust samples taken Thursday (September
13) showed levels of asbestos ranging from 2.1 percent to 3.3
percent. EPA views a 1 percent level of asbestos as the definition for
asbestos-containing material.1
0 3
But after White House vetting, the statement became:
The new samples confirm previous reports that ambient air quality
meets OSHA standards and consequently is not a cause for public
concern. New OSHA data also indicates that indoor air quality in
downtown buildings will meet standards... EPA continue(s) to
believe that there is no significant health risk to the general
public.... Debris samples... outside buildings on cars and other
surfaces contained small percentages of asbestors (sic), ranging from
2.1 to 3.3-slightly above the 1 percent trigger for defining asbestos
material. 1
04
Under the principal direction of New York City's Department of
Design and Construction and its subcontractors,'0 5 thousands of workers
99. Benzman v. Whitman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
100. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
EVALUATION REPORT: EPA'S RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE:
CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES, AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT, Report No. 2003-P-00012,
August 21, 2003 [hereinafter OIG Report].
101. Id. at i.
102. Id. at 7.
103. OIG Report at 16.
104. Press Release, Report of the Office of the Inspector General of the EPA
Instruction on September 16 (Sept., 16, 2001), cited in OIG Report.
105. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, S.D.N.Y., 21 MC 100 (AKH),
Plaintiffs' statement of undisputed material facts, at paragraphs 1-4, April 7, 2006.
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labored for months in deadly dust without adequate respiratory
protection. Equipment was available-OSHA reported giving out
130,000 half-face, cartridge respirators, the EPA gave out 22,000 and the
International Union of Operating Engineers provided 11,000.106 But
delay and enforcement shortcomings were substantial. 0 7 There was little
effort to properly fit the masks, to educate workers regarding the risks, to
overcome the considerable misinformation that had been put forth, or to
enforce the equipment's use by the workers on what came to be called
"the pile," the long smoldering ruins of the towers.1
0 8
Even among the heavy equipment operators, a disciplined, skilled,
and highly paid cadre with a strong union, only 50% were observed to be
using respirators in the October 2-16, 2001 observation period. Fit tests
were not offered widely on-site until 36 days after the disaster, a formal
safety and health plan was not issued until 48 days after the event, and
the first formal onsite safety training occurred 77 days after the
collapse. 109
The conditions for immigrant day laborers were predictably grim.
They had been given little protective equipment. Even less safety and
health information was given to day laborers than the highly unionized
workers on "the pile" received. Few had health insurance. The World
Trade Center Day Labor Monitoring Project examined 418 building
clean-up workers from January 15 through February 28, 2002. Nearly all
workers reported health problems that began while working near the
WTC site."l0
106. BRUCE E. LiPPY, Safety and Health of Heavy Equipment Operators at Ground
Zero, 42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INDUSTRAL MEDICNE 539, 540 (2002). Lippy, an
industrial hygienist, is Director of Research and Special Projects at the National Hazmat
Program of the International Union of Operating Engineers.
107. Plaintiffs' statement of undisputed material facts, at paragraphs 81-84 (Though
the City and contractors had 25,000 Tyvek protective suits they were not provided to
workers at Ground Zero, in marked contrast to the Fresh Kills landfill were availability
and compliance levels were high. Most workers did not receive respirator fit testing at
the WTC site, and that which was done did not meet OSHA standards.).
108. Plaintiffs' statement, paragraphs 68-79 (City's environmental health and safety
plan was neither enforced nor properly disseminated to workers at the WTC site); Paul A.
Lioy and Michael Gochfeld, Lessons Learned on Environmental, Occupational, and
Residential Exposures from the World Trade Center Attacks, 42 AM. J. OF INDUSTRIAL
MEDICINE 560 (2002) (In a natural or security emergency, response situation workers
must be protected against one or more substances. Merely making respirators available
does not assure their use. However, to implement such a program research needs to be
conducted on the design of a respirator to ensure that emergency responders use
respiratory protection, and use it in the correct manner. Many of the non-air pack
respirators are heavy and not easily worn over the nose and mouth during complex task
operations.).
109. Lippy, supra note 106, at figure 2.
110. Ekaterina Malievskaya, et al., Assessing the Health of Immigrant Workers Near
Ground Zero: Preliminary Results of the World Trade Center Day Laborer Medical
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By October 2002 significant health consequences for the Ground
Zero workers were reported. The American Journal of Industrial
Medicine devoted an issue to the health problems of the thousands of
Ground Zero workers. The journal reported that "the result will almost
certainly be unnecessary disease and death."' 1  Public health
surveillance is a series of snapshots. The moving picture appears only
after many shots have been taken, edited, arranged, and shown in
sequence. In April 2002, a medical surveillance program was established
at the Irving J. Selikoff Center for Occupational and Environmental
Medicine, Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York City.1 2 In September
2006 the Mt. Sinai program issued a five year assessment. The results
were dramatic. Sixty-nine percent of 9,442 responders examined
between July 2002 and April 2004 reported new or worsened respiratory
symptoms that occurred while performing WTC work, and symptoms
persisted to the time of examination in 59%. '3
At five years, the legacy of World Trade Center Dust is complex,
uncertain, and contentious. Granulomatous pulmonary disease and
airway hyperreactivity are reported among New York City Fire
Department rescue workers. The City's chief medical examiner has for
the first time linked a death to the dust. Dr. Charles S. Hirsch wrote that
"accumulating evidence" links "WTC dust" to "sarcoidosis or an
inflammatory reaction indistinguishable from sarcoidosis." Felicia
Dunn-Jones, a 42 year old lawyer, was engulfed as she ran from her
Monitoring Project, 42 AM. J. OF INDUSTRIAL MED. 548-49 (2002).
111. See Landrigan, supra note 11.
112. See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, World Trade Center
Response, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/wtc/.
113. Robin Herbert, et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health of
Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program, 114 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPECT. 1853, 1853-58 (2006), available at http://dx.doi.org/ (Approximately
40,000 rescue and recovery workers were exposed to caustic dust and toxic pollutants
following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC). These
workers included traditional first responders such as firefighters and police and a diverse
population of construction, utility, and public sector workers.) Id. at 1854. The WTC
Worker and Volunteer Medical Screening Program was established to characterize WTC-
related health effects. This multi-center clinical program provides free standardized
examinations to responders. Examinations include medical, mental health, and exposure
assessment questionnaires, physical examination, spirometry, and chest x-ray. Sixty-nine
percent of 9,442 responders examined between July 2002 and April 2004 reported new or
worsened respiratory symptoms while performing WTC work. Symptoms persisted to
the time of examination in 59%. Among those who had been asymptomatic before 9/11,
61% developed respiratory symptoms while performing WTC work. Twenty-eight
percent had abnormal spirometry. FVC was low in 21% of our population. Obstruction
was present in 5%. Among non-smokers, 27% had abnormal spirometry vs. 13% in the
general U.S. population. Prevalence of low FVC among nonsmokers was five-fold
greater than in the U.S. population (20% vs. 4%). Respiratory symptoms and spirometry
abnormalities were significantly associated with early arrival at the site.).
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office a block from the trade center. She died on February 10, 2002,
diagnosed with sarcoidosis. Hirsch concluded "whether or not she had
sarcoidosis prior to 9/11/01 it is likely, with certainty beyond a
reasonable doubt, that exposure to W.T.C. dust was harmful to her." He
ruled the dust "was contributory to her death."
'"14
Samet, Geyh and Utell report that some conclusions can be drawn.
First, the toxic mix and exposure levels are uncertain. Some responders
present in the days and hours after the disaster "have persistent
respiratory abnormalities consistent with inhaled particles and gases."
Any associated risk of respiratory and other cancers "will not be known
for decades." The respiratory health of the general population "may have
been affected." Determination of "actual causal contribution of the dust
to future risk of disease" will require "decades of commitment" to public
health surveillance and monitoring, especially of responders. But "even
the full suite of research efforts in progress may never provide the
evidence needed" to answer all the questions that will be raised about the
long term health effects of the events of September 11." 5
B. The Ground Zero Workers Respiratory Injury Tort Claims
Over three thousand Ground Zero workers have now filed claims
for respiratory illness, alleging exposure to and inhalation of "noxious
fumes, toxic substances, particulates and caustic substances.'' 16  Their
pleas have prompted governmental responses. The City of New York
established the World Trade Center Health Registry to follow the
workers and trace their health." 7 The New York Legislature has made
adjustments in the workers compensation statute of limitations for any
injuries that manifest themselves after the normal two year statute has
expired." 8 There have been adjustments in the New York State pension
114. Anthony DePalma, For the First Time, the City Connects a New York links a
Death to 9/11 Dust, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2007, at B1.
115. Jonathan M. Samet, Alison S. Geyh, & Mark Utell, The Legacy of World Trade
Center Dust, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2233, 2233-36 (2007).
116. World Trade Center Disaster Site Respiratory cases, U.S. District Court,
S.D.N.Y., consolidated on the docket as 21 MC 100; checkoff complaint, etc.
117. The City of New York's WTC Health Registry describes itself as "a
comprehensive and confidential health survey of those most directly exposed to the
events of 9/11/01. It will give health professionals a clear picture of the health
consequences of 9/11/01. Those who enrolled answered a 30-minute telephone survey
about where they were on 9/11/01 and when reported, were asked to report the status of
their health. This will allow health professionals to compare the health of those most
exposed to the events of 9/11/01 with the health of the general population." See
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/index.html.
118. N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 163 (McKinney 2006) S.8348, passed
August 14, 2006 (Creating a new Article 8-A of the workers compensation law: "World
Trade Center Rescue, Recovery, and Clean-Up Operations ... § 163 Notice shall be
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laws to allow recognition of WTC respiratory illnesses." 9
Workers find themselves fighting for workers compensation
benefits, 20 as well as pressing the traditional tort litigation now pending
in the federal court before Judge Hellerstein. For those who have
represented industrial workers in asbestos and other occupational disease
claims it is deja vu. But there are differences, principally the exclusive
federal jurisdiction, coverage limits, and the defense that the State
Disaster Emergency Act (SDEA) confers immunity on the City of New
York as the master general contractor in control of the site and that the
immunity extends to its construction managers and subcontractors.'
21
Those claims are covered by the WTC Captive Insurance Company's
$1 billion excess liability policy.
122
The exclusive federal cause of action has been found to extend to
the thousands of workers who have alleged injury during their work at
given to the employer, or in the case of a volunteer, to the [Workers Compensation]
Board, within two years after the disablement of the participant or after the participant
knew or should have known that the qualifying condition was causally related to his or
her participation in world trade center rescue, recovery and clean-up operations,
whichever is the later date.").
119. N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 63 (Consol. 2007) (establishing conditions for
accidental disability for state employees-setting a presumptive causal link between
WTC work in excess of 40 hours and "qualifying impairments," such as upper
respiratory, gastrointestinal tract, contact bums and dermatitis, and psychological
impairments).
120. Sewell Chan, City Workers' 9/11 Claims Meet Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2006, at B I ("Workers going through this process are being fought tooth and nail, while
justice and humanity call for providing them with the medical treatment that they need,"
said Joel A. Shufro, executive director of the New York Committee for Occupational
Safety and Health, a union-backed nonprofit educational organization that has often
criticized the city's handling of compensation claims. Dr. Robin Herbert, an
occupational-medicine specialist and incoming director of the World Trade Center Health
Effects Treatment Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center, said the workers'
compensation program was one of the most common sources of complaint among her
patients. "There's no question that our patients who have physical and mental health
consequences of the World Trade Center disaster have had their psychological distress
worsened by the difficult interactions with the workers' compensation system," she
said.). See also, Press Release, Office of the Governor, New York State (Aug. 14, 2006)
("The Governor ... announced a comprehensive plan to ensure that 9/11 rescue workers
receive prompt access to the benefits and health care they rightfully deserve under the
State's workers compensation system. The plan creates additional flexibility to provide
coverage for health care while claims are being litigated by the insurer, ensures access to
medical procedures that require pre-approval in a more time-sensitive manner, and calls
upon insurers to exercise options available to them under current law to provide workers
compensation benefits to claimants before their cases have been fully resolved.").
121. See, e.g. Defendants Reply Memorandum on federal immunity, May 12, 2006,
and Defendants's Reply Brief on State Statutory and Common Law Immunity, May 12,
2006.
122. See Policy of World Trade Center Captive Insurance Company, Inc., § 2
Coverage, § 4, Limits of Liability.
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the site of the destroyed towers. 123 ATSSSA § 408 limited the liability of
the City of New York "the greater of the city's insurance coverage or
$350,000,000" for all claims "arising from the terrorist related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001.124 Congress funded the WTC Captive
Insurance Company, Inc., which provides $1,000,000,000 aggregate
limit excess liability insurance to the City and its contractors for personal
injury claims arising post collapse from "debris removal" from the World
Trade Center site. 125
The Ground Zero respiratory claims have been consolidated for
discovery and are managed by Judge Hellerstein. 126 The cases present a
familiar array of "mass tort" problems such as have been seen in asbestos
litigation. 27 The claims are numerous, feature hard-fought, all-out, well-
123. See generally McNally v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir.
2005).
124. ATSSSA § 408(a)(3).
125. See Captive policy, supra note 122.
126. 21 MC 100 (AKH), Southern District of New York.
127. See, e.g., H.R. 1360, The Fair Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, H.R.
1360, 109th Cong. § Section 2 (2005):
(a) Findings--Congress finds the following:
(1) A great number of Americans have been exposed to forms of asbestos
that can have devastating health effects.
(2) Various injuries can be caused by exposure to some forms of asbestos,
including pleural disease and some forms of cancer.
(3) The injuries caused by asbestos can have latency periods of up to 40
years, and even limited exposure to some forms of asbestos may result in
injury in some cases.
(4) Asbestos litigation has had a significant detrimental effect on the
country's economy, driving companies into bankruptcy, diverting
resources from those who are truly sick, and endangering jobs and
pensions.
(5) The scope of the asbestos litigation crisis cuts across every State and
virtually every industry.
(6) The United States Supreme Court has recognized that Congress must
act to create a more rational asbestos claims system. In 1991, a Judicial
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, appointed by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, found that the 'ultimate solution should
be legislation recognizing the national proportions of the problem ... and
creating a national asbestos dispute resolution scheme. . . . The Court
found in 1997 in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 595
(1997), that '[t]he argument is sensibly made that a nationwide
administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure,
fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.'
In 1999, the Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 819, 821 (1999),
found that the 'elephantine mass of asbestos cases ... defies customary
judicial administration and calls for national legislation.' That finding was
again recognized in 2003 by the Court in Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
v. Ayers, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (2003).
(7) This crisis, and its significant effect on the health and welfare of the
people of the United States, on interstate and foreign commerce, and on
the bankruptcy system, compels Congress to exercise its power to regulate
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funded defense, threats of bankruptcy, unique non-replicable toxic
exposures, delayed manifestation of disease, evolving scientific data,
uncertainties regarding causal relationship, pressing needs for medical
treatment, contested workers compensation claims, contributory
negligence defenses, prospects of having to divide a limited fund when
not all claims are yet known and not all diseases have yet manifested
themselves, and, of course, expense for plaintiffs attorneys and delay for
the plaintiffs.128 In such cases, calls for caps on recovery, limitation of
claims, Special Masters and special Alternative Dispute Resolution
methods are common.
C. Familiar Ground: New York Labor Law § 241-Strict Liability for
Workers Doing Construction and Demolition Work
Tort law retains its vitality in the Ground Zero respiratory cases
because Congress, in the ATSSSA, treated the exclusive federal remedy
like a diversity action, incorporating the substantive law of New York
except to the extent it is preempted by federal law. So the action
proceeds in a familiar way, like a diversity case removed to federal court
in which the federal court is the forum but the substantive law is
typically that of the state where the cause of action arose. 1
29
Article 10 of New York's Labor Law establishes a statutory cause
of action for construction, repair, and demolition work. Its most
protective provision, § 241(6) has often been described as establishing
strict liability. § 241, entitled "Construction, excavation and demolition
work," provides:
interstate commerce and create this legislative solution in the form of a
national asbestos injury claims resolution program to supersede all
existing methods to compensate those injured by asbestos, except as
specified in this Act.
(b) Purpose-The purpose of this Act is to-
(1) create a privately funded, publicly administered fund to provide the
necessary resources for a fair and efficient system to resolve asbestos
injury claims that will provide compensation for legitimate present and
future claimants of asbestos exposure as provided in this Act;
(2) provide compensation to those present and future victims based on the
severity of their injuries, while establishing a system flexible enough to
accommodate individuals whose conditions worsens;
(3) relieve the Federal and State courts of the burden of the asbestos
litigation and;
(4) increase economic stability by resolving the asbestos litigation crisis
that has bankrupted companies with asbestos liability, diverted resources
from the truly sick, and endangered jobs and pensions.
128. See JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
383 (2007) (providing a comprehensive survey of the range of legal and factual issues
presented by claims of workers and residents of lower Manhattan).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002).
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All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one
and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or
control the work, when constructing or demolishing buildings or
doing any excavating in connection therewith, shall comply with the
following requirements:
6. All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition
work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored,
equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to
provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the
persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.
The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the
provisions of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors
and their agents for such work.. . shall comply therewith.
130
The statute has long been understood to impose liability on owners
for injuries arising from unsafe conditions even if they did not know of
the hazard,131 and even if they exercised no control over the work. 132 In
Rizzuto v. Wenger Contracting Co.133 the Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff need not show the existence of a specific provision of the
industrial safety code in order to make out a cause of action under § 241
of New York's Labor Law.
Plaintiffs' lawyers in the Ground Zero cases are on familiar ground.
Tort retains its familiar rhythms, boundaries, and purpose. Without it the
workers would be limited to the $400/week maximum benefit provided
by New York workers compensation law. 134 But they also must work to
130. N.Y. CLS LABOR LAW § 241 (Consol. 2007).
131. See generally Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp, 376 N.E.2d 1276 (N.Y. 1978) (A
married couple contracted for the construction of a one family dwelling on land owned by
them. An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was killed in a trench cave-in during
construction of the house. The couple was held to be subject to strict liability under
subdivision 6 of section 241 because of non-compliance with safety rules promulgated by
the Board of Standards and Appeals. The couple's argument that they had no direction or
control over the work was held without effect in light of the statute's clear imposition of
strict liability on owners). The statute was later amended to exclude two family home
owners who did not retain control.
132. See generally Haimes v. N.Y. Tel. Comp., 385 N.E.2d 601 (N.Y. 1978)
(Defendant argued against strict liability where a self-employed independent painting
contractor fell to his death while painting a cornice on a building owned by defendant
who exercised no direction or control over the decedent's work. The Court expanded and
reinforced the rationale in Allen that owners, regardless of their status, and regardless of
their lack of direction and control, are strictly liable, in this case under section 240.).
133. See generally Rizzuto v. Wenger Contracting Co., 693 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1998).
134. On March 13, 2007 the Governor of New York signed Chapter 6 of the Laws of
2007 [A.6163/S.3322] raising the maximum weekly rate for total disability to $500/week
from $400/week for accidents occurring after July 1, 2007. Death benefits are capped at
$750/week, an increase from $600/week. See Workers' Compensation Board, Change in
Workers' Compensation Benefit Rates, (2007), http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/
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establish that their conditions are causally related to their WTC work in
order to get workers compensation benefits. In the tort actions they will
find the familiar hurdles of cause in fact, proximate cause and
contributory negligence waiting, though where it can be shown that the
employer, contractor, or owner did not provide any safety devices, the
defense of comparative negligence is unavailable.1 35 And there are those
most familiar burdens of the well-defended case, delay and expense.
D. Civil Defense and Emergency Immunity
The Ground Zero workers filed their complaints in New York State
Supreme Court. The City, its contractors, and the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey removed the state tort actions to federal court,
citing ATSSSA § 408(b). However, Judge Hellerstein remanded the
actions to the state trial court as not arising from September 11, except to
the extent that they asserted injuries incurred before the emergency
ended on September 29, 2001 with the official declaration that the search
for survivors had ended. 136 The defendants appealed from the remand
order. It was reversed, with the suggestion by Judge Kearse for the
Second Circuit in McNally v. Port Authority'37 that the September 29 cut-
off date for exclusive federal jurisdiction was unpersuasive. The actions
remained venued in the Southern District of New York before Judge
Hellerstein.
The City, its contractors, and the Port Authority moved to dismiss
the complaints based on immunity grounds. The defendants say they are
immune under the federal Stafford Act, which, tracking the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 38 provides immunity for discretionary acts. 139 They also
rely on a civil defense measure, New York's State Defense Emergency
Act (SDEA).
SubjectNos/sn046_183.htm (last accessed Aug. 8, 2007).
135. See generally Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 482 N.E.2d 898
(N.Y. 1985).
136. See Hickey v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.),
270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 380 (S.D.N.Y., 2003) (The last survivor was found on September
12.).
137. McNally v. Port Auth., 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2002).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq (2002). The liability provision in § 5148 recites the
familiar discretionary/ministerial function defense. See Federal Tort Claims Act 28
U.S.C. 2674-2680:
The Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the
exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal
Government in carrying out the provisions of this Act.
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1. Stafford Act Immunity
The City, its contractors, and construction managers argued that
"[o]ur nation's devastating experiences with the September 11th attacks
and the more recent hurricane Katrina recovery have poignantly
illustrated the need for federal agencies to be able seamlessly and
productively co-ordinate their efforts with their state and local
counterparts as well as with responding private contractors."'' 40  The
defendants assert that the Stafford Act, § 5148, provides such protection.
The City and its contractors, who began work first under the supervision
of the City's Emergency Management Office 4 ' and the Department of
Design and Construction, which hired all the contractors and had control
of the site, were said to be entitled to "derivative (Stafford Act) federal
immunity for any claims brought by plaintiffs alleging that the negligent,
faulty, fraudulent, or non-performance of those activities" in which a
"federal agency had explicitly assumed the lead role."'1
42
But the defense rhetoric, which has superficial appeal, must
confront the plain language of § 5148, which limits immunity to
discretionary functions. Under New York Labor Law § 240, it is not a
discretionary function but rather is actionable to fail to provide workers
with adequate safety equipment, accurate information for preservation of
their health, and to violate safety codes such as those adopted by the U.S.
Department of Labor in OSHA and the State of New York. Failure to
implement safety codes is not a discretionary judgment, but rather an
operational decision. 43 The basic principles of the Federal Tort Claims
140. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Based
on Federal Immunity.
141. Its command center in WTC 7 was destroyed when the tower collapsed. The
building, the Con-Ed substation underneath and the huge store of diesel fuel were major
sources of contaminants. Property damage claims of design defect were rejected. Aegis
Ins. Servs. v. Port Auth., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
142. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of motion for summary judgment based
on federal immunity, at p. 2.
143. Daly v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., at 721 (stating:
(P)laintiffs base their claims on defendants' alleged failure to perform
nondiscretionary duties, i.e., the mandatory, nondelegable requirements of
Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) and the Industrial Code. (Compare DiFlorio v
Worden, 303 A.D.2d 924, 755 N.Y.S.2d 679 [4th Dept 2003] [no evidence of
fixed, clearly defined duty].). If, in the circumstances presented, Labor Law
§ 240(1)and § 241(6) were applicable,.., the City would have been no more
free to violate them than it would have been free to violate the Prevailing Wage
Law (Labor Law § 220), had it been applicable. Neither the City nor any other
entity has discretion to violate an applicable statute. Executive Law § 25(5)
HN24 does not automatically exempt a political subdivision from liability for
every act that its employees or agents perform in the course of a large project,
solely because the subdivision has discretion over how it organizes and
executes that project. Rather, section 25(5) provides that a political subdivision
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Act are replicated by the Stafford Act. Judge Hellerstein gave little
credence to the federal immunity argument during the two days of
argument on the immunity motions June 22 and 26, 2006.144
2. Defenses: Good Faith, Emergency and the SDEA
Until memory was revived by the City and its contractors in their
motions to dismiss, the Defense Emergency Act had been a dormant
vestige of the Cold War years when we prepared for nuclear war with the
USSR. But the SDEA remained on the books and it contains an
immunity provision capable of broad construction:
the state, any political subdivision, municipal or volunteer agency,
* * * or any agency, member, agent or representative of any of them,
or any individual, partnership, corporation, association, trustee,
receiver or any of the agents thereof, in good faith carrying out,
complying with or attempting to comply with any law, any rule,
regulation or order duly promulgated or issued pursuant to this act,
any federal law, * * * or any order issued by federal or state military
authorities, relating to civil defense, including but not limited to
activities pursuant thereto, in preparation for anticipated attack,
during attack, or following attack * * * shall not be liable for any
injury or death to persons or damage to property as the result
thereof. 1
45
The immunity motions based on the State Defense Emergency Act
are more formidable than those based on the Stafford Act. But the issue
was ruled upon by the New York Supreme Court before the Second
Circuit in McNally v. Port Authority146 directed in July 2005 that the
respiratory cases proceed in federal court. In Daly v. Port Authority,
New York Supreme Court Justice Michael Stallman rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the Cold War civil defense act was obsolete and
ineffective. He held that the police power of the state to protect the
public health expressed in the maxim "salus populi suprema lex"
immunized the State for negligent acts taken in the heat of emergency.
Stallman ruled that the emergency ended on September 29, 2001 when
the search for survivors was officially abandoned.1
47
The defense argued that preservation of the slurry wall, the search
for human remains, and cleanup of Ground Zero until May 2002
"shall not be liable for any claim based upon.., the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty.).
144. See transcript of argument, passim. (on file with author).
145. N.Y. Unconsol. § 9193(1) (emphasis added).
146. McNally v. Port Authority, 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005).
147. Daly v. Port Auth., 793 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 2005).
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constituted "civil defense" activities for which the defendant City and its
contractors are immune. SDEA immunity, they argued, extends even to
negligent acts, if the negligent parties acted with an honest purpose in
good faith. Such an extension of the emergency period, Justice Stallman
found, was unreasonable.
48
Justice Stallman observed in Daly that the New York Court of
Appeals had only once ruled on the scope of the SDEA's immunity
provision.149 In Abbott v. Page Airways, the high court had held that a
helicopter operator, chartered by the state to fly over the scene of a
prison rebellion, was not immune in a wrongful death action. The
helicopter operator was engaging in its "normal business" and not in
"civil defense activity under § 9193(). '15O In Abbott the high court
evidenced a view that the statute should be narrowly construed to
preserve the right to compensation. Stallman also noted that courts have
consistently construed Labor Law § 240 liberally in order to compensate
construction and demolition workers for injuries on job sites with
inherently hazardous work.
151
Emergency does not relieve one of the duties of reasonable care. It
is a circumstance to be considered by the jury or fact-finder in
determining the reasonableness of conduct.1 52 Judge Hellerstein found
this line of reasoning persuasive. Late in the two days of argument on
the immunity motions he located in the statute the traditional use of the
emergency concept in tort law. Judge Hellerstein observed:
Immunity from suit is a very important point because it means that
something decided in haste should not be open to Monday morning
post-event quarterbacking. The quarterback on the spot, the guy who
makes the calls, the difficult calls, are to be given plenty of slack to
be able to make those calls. And clearly, a government that acts for
the welfare of all, and what's the Latin, Mr. Tyrrell ... Salus
153populi ... to allow some of us to sue all of us for acts taken for the
benefit of all is anomalous it's just wrong.. . . But when there is a
call upon a certain class of people to work intensively for a long
period of time, and to subject themselves to injuries which they claim
were negligently caused, is a different situation, particularly when
there's insurance monies to spread that out .... When matters are
148. Id. at 721.
149. Id. at 716.
150. Abbott v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 508 (N.Y. 1969).
151. Daly, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 716 (citing Wise v. 141 McDonald Avenue, 297 A.D. 2d
515, 516 (N.Y. App. Div.lst Dept. 2002); Wilson v. City of New York, 89 F. 3d 32, 36
(2d Cir. 1996).
152. DANIEL B. DOBBS, THE LAWOF TORTS §§ 128-31 (2000).
153. The Latin maxim is "salus populit suprema lex". The health of the people is the
highest law.
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spread out over time, and insurance monies are gathered to help
defray the expense, the burden of inequity may shift, and maybe
protection is needed for the people who day after day risk their lives
and their lungs in promoting the public weal. That's a difficult
issue. 154
Judge Hellerstein has been loathe to make precipitous and early
dispositive rulings. On October 16, 2006 he ruled as he had suggested he
would. On the key issue in In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litigation, he held that the New York State Defense Emergency Act
(SDEA) extends immunity, but not to all activities following an
emergency. 155 It limits immunity only to those activities that are, in
themselves, "essential," or "immediately essential," and "emergency" in
nature. 156  He thus construed the statute's text to limit immunity to
activities that must be done immediately to resolve pressing needs, in
order to enable society to prepare for an attack, and to begin to function
following an attack. 57  The respiratory claims will now proceed to
discovery and trial.
Thousands of hours have already been spent in dozens of
depositions and in obtaining and reviewing hundreds of thousands of
documents to reconstruct the history of the ineffective safety and health
command and control at the Ground Zero rescue, recovery, and debris
removal operations. 58 Many more days and weeks will be consumed as
plaintiffs try to prove that the City and its contractors' claims of good
faith conduct and emergency-dictated immunity claims are unwarranted
and that the plaintiffs' diseases are reliably attributable to their exposures
at the site of the World Trade Center.
154. Transcript of Proceedings before Alvin K. Hellerstein, D.J., In Re WTC Disaster
Site Litigation, 21 MC 100, (S.D.N.Y.), June 26, 2006.
155. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 553 (SDNY
2006).
156. Id. at 547-48.
157. Id. at 554 (footnote omitted) (stating:
The SDEA's immunity provision operates to ensure that fear of liability will
not operate to dissuade government and private entities from responding to a
disaster, even in the absence of otherwise mandated safety protocols and
procedures. However, as the emergency condition fades, as the rights and
obligations of persons and entities engaged in the response effort become
regulated by contract, . . . as procedures and protocols are implemented to
protect against potential dangers, the need for immunity diminishes and the
obligations and duties otherwise imposed once again must be protected.).
158. Transcript of Record at 140, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC
100 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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E. Aftermath of Judge Hellerstein's Decision to Allow the Ground
Zero Cases to Proceed: Special Masters-and an Expanded 9/11
Victims Fund?
Judge Hellerstein's October 16, 2006 ruling, which denied the
defense immunity motions without prejudice, demonstrated his intention
to keep in his hands plenary power to move the parties to settle the
cases. 159 Hellerstein took further action quickly. On December 4, 2006
he retained jurisdiction of the non-respiratory claims. 160 He had in June
2006 ordered plaintiffs to "remove" all medical monitoring claims from
their complaints.1 61 On December 12, 2006, using Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53(a)(1)(C), he appointed as Special Masters two prominent
academics, the Reporters for the American Law Institute's 1998 Products
Liability Restatement. Hellerstein gave the professors a writ to work to
structure the litigation with a view toward settlement:
The Special Masters (James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski)
will create intelligent and informative categories to enable cases to be
considered efficiently and according to their particularized facts,
ensuring that each case receives the individual treatment it deserves,
while enabling the parties to value the claims and defenses, make
appropriate motions, conduct relevant discovery, and organize trials.
The purpose of the Special Masters' involvement is not to resolve
disputed issues of fact or law, but to monitor compliance with court
orders, and help organize the cases to facilitate their efficient and just
progress. Without their help, neither plaintiffs nor defendants will be
able to organize and present the facts and issues, delaying justice, and
perhaps denying it entirely. 
62
The court's approach is well supported by accumulated judicial
experience. An example is that of New Jersey. Most of the asbestos in
orth America was processed there. Its refineries, shipyards, and smelting
plants consumed enormous quantities of the mineral. A massive
159. World Trade Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
160. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (SDNY
2006).
161. Judge Hellerstein noted in his order denying the parties objection to his
appointment of Special Masters that "(b)y separate Summary Order of June 27, 2006,...
I ordered plaintiffs to remove those counts alleging claims for medical monitoring and
fear of cancer in their master complaint." See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
456 - F. Supp. 2d 520 __ (SDNY Oct. 17, 2006) (recounting procedural history of
plaintiffs' complaints). Prayer for such relief may perhaps be considered as equitable
remedies, if causes of action are otherwise proved and if the remedies are held to be
appropriate and in accordance with the law. They do not constitute independent causes
of action."
162. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93639, 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. December 12, 2006).
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epidemic followed. The courts handled huge numbers of claims.
Drawing on that experience the state Supreme Court's mass tort manual
observes:
Mass torts often require complex fact finding during pretrial, in
preparation for trial, or in aid of settlement. Referrals to a neutral
may at times be helpful, either by relieving the judge of time-
consuming proceedings or by bringing special expertise to bear on
specific issues in dispute. In addition to or in the absence of the full-
time court employed masters, the mass tort judge has discretion, with
the approval of the Chief Justice, to appoint special masters....
Settlement activity in mass tort litigation tends to parallel pretrial and
trial organization. Consolidated cases tend to generate settlement-
related information at the same time and follow a settlement
timetable driven by pretrial and trial deadlines. In general,
organization of cases along individual plaintiff lines can be expected
to lead to individual settlements, and organization along aggregated
lines can be expected to produce aggregated settlements. See The
[Federal] Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth Edition at 167-
182. 163
Hellerstein's orders spurred a new impulse to settle the cases, which
are the object of enormous media attention in New York. Two days after
the Special Masters' appointment September 11 Fund Administrator
Feinberg weighed in on the issue. Writing in the New York Times,
Feinberg lamented the "flood of litigation continues unabated in federal
court in Manhattan."'164 He noted that because "none of these 6,000
people who have filed lawsuits received diagnoses of 9/11-related
injuries until after the [September 11 Victims' Compensation F]und's
filing deadline of Dec. 22, 2003, they were ineligible for compensation.
So, reluctantly, they have turned to the courts."'
165
Suggesting that the September 11 Fund provides a "blueprint" for
settlement, Feinberg proposed cobbling together a $1.5 billion fund
principally taken from the WTC Captive Insurance Company's $1 billion
excess liability coverage. "If you add financial contributions from those
contractors and others involved in the litigation, and supplement that
with funds from various city charities, a total of at least $1.5 billion is
available to settle the pending lawsuits-more than sufficient to pay all
163. NEW JERSEY MASS TORT (NON-ASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK, Administrative
Office of the Courts (2005) at 10-11; see The Federal Judicial Center, The Manual for
Complex Litigation at 167-82 (4th ed. 2004).
164. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Op-Ed, A Fair Deal for 9/11 's Injured, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
14, 2006, A.
165. Id.
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eligible claims, as well as lawyers' fees and costs.'
16 6
But Feinberg identified no principle, other than the desirability of
"compensating victims in distress," for why any special measures should
be undertaken.' 67 He states merely that "just as the 9/11 fund should be
viewed as a unique public policy response to an unprecedented national
calamity, so, too, would this settlement be considered a one-time solution
to all remaining physical injury claims occurring at the World Trade
Center."' 168 But compensating victims in distress is a reason to settle
every personal injury claim, regardless of fault, and to compensate every
victim of a natural disaster. Suffering alone provides no reason for
extraordinary governmental action beyond the $1 billion committed to
the Captive insurance Fund (which is being eroded by defense costs-
$50 million to December 2006, of which $32 million went to law
firms).
16 9
Every complication in these claims has been seen before. The
uncertainty of diagnoses, the uncertainties of liability, the difficulties of
proof of extent of exposure and of causal relationship of alleged harm
and alleged wrong have been present in hundreds of thousands of
asbestos cases processed in every jurisdiction in the country in the 30
years since Judge John Minor Wisdom and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the landmark product liability claim
of asbestos-exposed Clarence Borel.17
0
Feinberg's proposal for a second fund which would be limited to the
Captive Fund, and the available insurance was quickly seen to be
inadequate. The New York Times reported on December 19, 2006 that
"(t)he roughly $40 million that was set aside by the federal government
to treat rescue workers, volunteers and firefighters who became ill after
helping with the 9/11 cleanup and recovery will run out in months."
Distribution of the $75 million in federal dollars recently obtained had
"begun in earnest" only in October 2006. Officials at the Mt. Sinai and
Fire Department monitoring and treatment programs said that money
could run out by "spring or summer" 2007. Federal officials were
reported to project "total annual costs of $256 million.',
71
Area members of Congress objected. They said that Feinberg's




169. Susan Edelman, Federal Probe of $1B 9/11 Fund, N.Y. POST, December 3,
2006, B.
170. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974).
171. Sewell Chan, Money to Treat 9/11 Workers Will Run Out, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, December 19, 2006, available at www.nytimes.com (last accessed December 29,
2006).
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have no estimate from the government of how much monitoring, treating
and compensating the sick will cost. Doctors from Mount Sinai Medical
Center have testified that this crisis will span decades, so compensation
is likely to cost much more than the $1.5 billion Mr. Feinberg identifies."
And, the members of Congress noted,"(d)uring his excellent tenure
managing the fund, Mr. Feinberg had unlimited access to money he
needed to compensate those who lost loved ones and many others who
were injured. A new fund either needs this type of flexibility or an
agreed-upon estimate of the total costs based on an independent
review." 171
Demonstrating the passion often observed regarding these issues,
Representatives Carolyn Maloney (Queens), Vito Fossella (Staten
Island), and Senator Robert Menendez (New Jersey) concluded:
Imposing a limit without accurate information about the prospective
cost would be a disservice to the heroes who had the misfortune not
only of getting sick but also getting sick after the congressionally
imposed Victim Compensation Fund deadline. 1
73
In February 2007 the World Trade Center Health Panel, a
commission appointed by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
reported on problems not only of the Ground Zero cleanup workers but
also of area residents and workers. Costs for direct medical treatment
and monitoring "could exceed $392 million per year." The report
addressing the Health Impacts of 9/11 was immediately embraced by the
Mayor. It calls for a vigorous campaign to obtain federal funding for
treatment, monitoring, and research regarding all those whose health may
have been affected by the disaster.
174
Prominent among the Panel's recommendations is a call for tort
immunity for the City and its contractors:
Congress should reopen the Victim Compensation Fund (VCF),
authorized by Congress in 2001, so that victims can quickly get fair
compensation without the need to prove liability. At the same time
the fund is re-opened, Congress should eliminate the liability of the
City and its contractors for claims arising out of the clean-up at the
World Trade Center. Since the WTC Captive Insurance Company
("CIC") would no longer be needed, Congress could also liquidate
172. (Rep.) Carolyn B. Maloney, (Senator) Robert Menendez, (Rep.) Vito Fossella,
9/11 Health Lawsuits, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, December 21, 2006 at A.
173. Id.
174. World Trade Center Health Panel, Addressing the Health Impacts of 9-11-
Report and Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg (February 13, 2007);
Anthony DePalma, Bloomberg urges More Aid for Those Sickened After 9/11, N.Y.
TIMES, February 14, 2007 at B3.
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the CIC and use its $1 billion to help fund the reopened VCF.1
7 5
Claimants and their advocates will doubtless ask why liability
should be capped at such modest sums as Feinberg suggests when the
City itself is awash in cash. Fueled by real estate taxes and the financial
markets boom, the City is building cash reserves and paying down
debt.1 76 Others may grant that 9/11 is properly seen as a national tragedy
for which a special solidarity is warranted yet ask why the national
government should shoulder the entire burden. Should not New York
City and its contractors bear the burden if they mismanaged the clean-up,
hedlessly exposing thousands to health hazards arising from work for
which no lives were at risk save those of the workers?
It should further be noted that beyond compensation, the tort system
provides two important benefits: first, its workings hold up to scrutiny
the claims for justice of those who believe that they have been grievously
wronged by the City and its contractors; and second, the litigation has
driven the City and Congress to address the health needs of its citizens.
The complexity of the litigation has produced delays. Judge
Hellerstein has now taken the step of severing liability and damages
issues, perhaps uniquely scheduling bellwether damages trials while
liability discovery continues. He explains his decision eloquently:
In a few months, six years will have passed since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. Forty-one cases on behalf of forty-two
victims remain pending in this Court in the 21 MC 97 track, and there
are other many other cases in other consolidated tracks arising out of
the events of September 11. Yet the resolution of these forty-one
cases is not close at hand. The complexity of these cases and the
additional procedures required by the sensitive nature of the
discovery sought have slowed and complicated this litigation
considerably... . Time heals, but time also works against us.
Elderly parents who brought actions on behalf of their deceased
children will not live forever. Grieving widows and friends waiting
for these proceedings to bring them closure may wait too long. And
the public, in measures both large and small, share the families'
concerns. Many would like to see Plaintiffs' assertions tested in a
trial and either found or rejected in a jury verdict. For such persons,
long delays are a frustration and denial of the justice sought. Thus I
175. Id.
176. SEWELL CHAN, Mayor Projects Huge Surplus Fed by Boom in Real Estate, NEW
YORK Times, January 26, 2007 (City projects $3.9 billion surplus for fiscal year ending
June 30, 2007; and $1.4 billion surplus next year) available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/04/26/nyregion/26budget.html?amp;ei=5124&en=9d7db76 10e71301 b&ex= 133524
0000&adxnnl=1 &partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&adxnnlx = I 188417668-
+F6yPK9MVtKsvy0UkmqkPQ (last accessed Aug, 27, 2007).
[Vol. 112:1
2007] WILL THE POST 9/11 WORLD BE A POST-TORT WORLD? 217
scheduled damages trials.
177
To this moment one can say that little of tort law has been eroded by
9/11. The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund allowed us to side-
step the special problem of attributing liability to the "enabling
tortfeasors" for the criminal acts of the attackers and their victims on the
ground. That was the biggest challenge to tort doctrine posed by the
events of 9/11. In the case of the Ground Zero workers the law of torts
has shown notable strength, providing a coherent approach to the
problems. We look next at post 9/11 legislative measures which have
mounted a more direct assault on tort.
IV. The Second Wave-Federal Immunity for Products
The September 11 attacks were soon followed by several criminal
attacks in which anthrax was mailed to journalists and members of
Congress. It prompted a wave of fear and several deaths. 78 The synergy
of anthrax and 9/11 spurred the fear that anything is possible and that the
unimaginable is not only possible but may arrive not only from the clear
blue sky but in the mail in plain envelopes. The 9/11 calamity and the
anthrax attacks spurred a series of federal legislative measures which
afforded liability protections to health care workers, drug, vaccine, and
medical device manufacturers. It began with smallpox.
A. The Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act (SEPPA)
Driven by the post-9/11 fear that the unthinkable was thinkable, the
government pressed for and obtained a reversal of the 30 year-old policy
of not vaccinating citizens against smallpox disease. In his 2003 State of
the Union address the President evoked the then-fearsome image of
Saddam Hussein with a stock of viruses at hand. 7 9
177. Opinion Supporting Order to Sever Issues of Damages and Liability in Selected
Cases, and to Schedule Trial of Issues of Damages, 21 MC 97 [AKH] (S.D. N.Y.) July 5,
2007.
178. See Federation of American Scientists, Anthrax Fact Sheet, http://www.fas.org/
biosecurity/resource/factsheets/anthrax.htm (last accessed June 12, 2007).
179. George W. Bush, The State of the Union, January 28, 2003 ("As we fight this
war [against terrorism], we will remember where it began-here, in our own country.
This government is taking unprecedented measures to protect our people and defend our
homeland. We've ... begun inoculating troops and first responders against smallpox,
and are deploying the nation's first early warning network of sensors to detect biological
attack.... Before September the 11 th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein
could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses, and shadowy terrorist networks
are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other
plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one
crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.
We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.... I ask
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The smallpox vaccination program of 2003 was unique in public
health history. The disease has been eradicated. No one is known to be
at risk of infection. But it is possible that scientific research stocks of the
virus could be misappropriated, and the vaccination used as a weapon.
The benefit of a prophylactic vaccination program therefore is
unquantifiable. There could be no benefit. But that there was danger to
some in vaccination with the live vaccinia virus vaccine was certain. Yet
the government opted not for preparedness to vaccinate, but rather to
begin large scale inoculation.
1 80
The federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in December 2002
announced a program intended to recruit for voluntary smallpox
vaccination in the first stage 500,000 health workers. But only 38,000
volunteered in the first 8 months of the program. The military required
vaccination of 400,000 soldiers and sailors, and 50,000 civilian
employees.181  Few civilians volunteered and fortunately few were
injured. Because they conducted scrupulous surveillance of military
vaccinees the Defense Department medical teams identified previously
unsuspected rare complications, such as myopericarditis, which were
observed in significant numbers. Active surveillance made possible
quick identification of the cardiac hazard and the promulgation of new
clinical guidelines for excluding non-military volunteers at risk for such
illnesses. 182  Compensation programs and studies of adverse health
effects of a resumed smallpox vaccination program were intensely
debated. A very spare program of compensation was enacted.1
83
1. Liability Limitations and Compensation
The basic SEPPA scheme is that the U.S. absorbs all liability-
except for misconduct in sale, distribution or administration. During the
period of a judicially unreviewable administrative declaration by the
you tonight to add to our future security with a major research and production effort to
guard our people against bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield. The budget I send you
will propose almost $6 billion to quickly make available effective vaccines and
treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague. We must
assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons, and we must act before
the dangers are upon us.").
180. Institute of Medicine, The Smallpox Vaccination Program: Public Health in an
Age of Terrorism (2005).
181. Id.; see also George W. Conk, Reactions and Overreactions: Smallpox
Vaccination, Complications, and Compensation, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 439 (2003).
182. Grabenstein, et al., U.S. Military Smallpox Vaccination Experience, J. AM. MED.
Assoc. 288: 3278-3282 (2003); Mary E. Wright & Anthony S. Fauci, Smallpox
Immunization in the 21st Century: The Old and the New, 289 JAMA 3306, 3308 (2003);
Casev, et al., Adverse Events Associated With Smallpox Vaccination in the United States,
January-October 2003, JAMA 294:2734-2743 (2005).
183. Conk, supra note 181, at 440.
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Secretary of Health and Human Services that there is a "possible"
smallpox emergency, all state-law based personal injury tort claims
arising out of manufacture, sale, distribution, or administration of a
"covered countermeasure" [smallpox (variola) inoculation via the
vaccinia virus] are preempted. The claims are replaced by an
administrative remedy, which must be exhausted before an action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act may be pursued against the United States.
Administrative compensation is tied to scheduled injuries for which
causal relationship is presumed (similar to the Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program).184  Wage loss and medical benefits are
secondary to all other benefits and collateral sources including workers
compensation, and a death benefit is patterned on (but not duplicative of)
the Public Service Officers Benefit program (a Department of Justice
administered program). 1
85
The Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, for
liability purposes, deems any "covered person" to be an employee of the
United States Public Health Service for whom the United States is
vicariously liable, who acts during the period of a "declaration of an
actual or potential bioterrorist incident or other actual or potential public
health emergency."' 86  A covered person is defined as any one who
manufactures, distributes, or administers, or sponsors the administration
of the smallpox vaccine. 87 Except for misconduct, the United States
assumes all liability for claims arising from smallpox vaccine
manufacture, sale and administration. The exclusive remedy by a
vaccine or other injured person against such a "covered person" by an
injured person is an administrative claim which may be followed by a
tort action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
88
That remedy requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy
considerably thinner than the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (NCVICP), 8 9 which Congress used only as a
partial model. SEPPA claims are not administrative matters presented in
the U.S. Court of Claims. As in the NCVICP, claims under SEPPA are
184. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(aa)-l
through 34 (2002) (Claims under the National Vaccine Injury compensation program are
administered by the Office of Special Masters, United States Court of Federal Claims.).
185. 42 U.S.C. §3796, et seq (2006) (administered by the Department of Justice, the
PSOB provides benefits to public service officers injured in the line of duty). See Bureau
of Justice Assistance, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/psob/psobmain.html (last
accessed June 12, 2007). See Conk, supra note 181 (recounting the history of the
vaccination campaign and the structure of the Smallpox Emergency Act).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2002) (actions against commissioned officers or employees of
the United States Public Health Service).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 233(p)(7)(B).
188. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa to aa-34 (1984).
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presumed related if the condition is listed in a table of recognized injuries
and if it appears within the recognized time-frame after exposure. 9 ' But
SEPPA's compensatory plan is more limited than those under the
Childhood Vaccine program. SEPPA makes no provision for pain and
suffering. That is unlike the NCVIP, which provides for non-economic
damages of up to $250,0009.'9 SEPPA narrowly defines medical benefits
as those prescribed by a physician. SEPPA does not cover other
necessary services available under the Childhood vaccine program, such
as vocational rehabilitation, residential and custodial care to enable a
victim to continue living at home. 192 SEPPA benefits are secondary to
all other coverage. 193 NCVICP provides for attorney's fees to successful
claimants. 194 SEPPA has no such provision.
SEPPA wage loss benefits are secondary to workers compensation.
They are capped at 66 2/3% of "loss of employment income," or 75% if
the claimant has "one or more dependents." There is a $50,000 annual
limit per year, capped by the amount payable under the Public Safety
Officers Benefit Program, 195 except in the case of permanent and total
disability. Wage loss benefits under the Act cease at age 65.196 A death
benefit is provided, tracking that of the PSOB program, which is adjusted
yearly. Any payments for lost income are deducted from the death
190. See Smallpox Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES AND
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://www.hrsa.gov/smallpoxinjury/table.htm (last accessed
October 28, 2006).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (1984).
192. Compare the SEPPA, 42 U.S.C. § 239(c) ("Medical benefits (a) In general.
Subject to the succeeding provisions of this section, the Secretary shall make payment or
reimbursement for medical items and services as reasonable and necessary to treat a
covered injury of an eligible individual, including the services, appliances, and supplies
prescribed or recommended by a qualified physician, which the Secretary considers likely
to cure, give relief, reduce the degree or the period of disability, or aid in lessening the
amount of monthly compensation.") with the NCVICP § 15(a)(iii) ("were for diagnosis,
medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation, developmental evaluation, special
education, vocational training and placement, case management services, counseling,
emotional or behavioral therapy, residential and custodial care and service expenses,
special equipment, related travel expenses, and facilities determined to be reasonably
necessary") and NCVICP § 15(c) ("Residential and custodial care and service. The
amount of any compensation for residential and custodial care and service expenses
under subsection (a)(1) shall be sufficient to enable the compensated person to remain
living at home.").
193. 42 U.S.C. § 239(c) (2002).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa(e) (2002).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2002).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 239(d) (2002). These benefits too are secondary to all other benefits
and may be paid in a lump sum or over "multiple years." Cf. NCVIA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-15 (affording compensation for all "actual and anticipated loss of earnings
determined in accordance with generally recognized actuarial principles and
projections").
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benefit,
197
After exhaustion of the administrative remedy the smallpox
claimant retains the elective remedy of the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the United States which stands in the shoes of the a "covered
person" which includes a manufacturer.
198
SEPPA's narrow compensation scheme, rather than NCVIP,
provided the model for the later, more broad-reaching measure: the
hyperbolically-named the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act of 2005.199
2. The Impact of SEPPA on Tort Claims
Most of those vaccinated were soldiers and defense department
personnel. The Department of Defense civilian employees were assured
of workers compensation and the soldiers, who had no choice, were at
least assured of medical care, and, potentially service-connected
disability. The others, volunteer vaccines were mainly non-federal
health workers who subjected themselves to the vaccine's risks in
response to employers' requests.
200
The smallpox vaccination campaign never reached the contemplated
10 million health workers and the vaccine was never offered to the
general public. So we saw no injury reports beyond those of health
workers, who have presumably pursued workers compensation or
smallpox fund claims. But there are a myriad of tort actions that could
arise in a mass "pre-event" smallpox vaccination program such as was
contemplated but only partially accomplished in the 2003 campaign.2 1
In a mass vaccination campaign (assuming no manufacturing defect,
and no available alternative safer vaccine design defect claim) tort claims
would center on informed consent. The defendants would be product
manufacturers who failed to provide sufficient information, or against
medical providers who failed to advise patients at particular risk of
202complications, or against the government if in a mass campaign it
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2002); see also Bureau of Justice Assistance, Public
Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/
PSOBProgram.html (last accessed October 28, 2006) (setting benefit limit at $295,194
for 2007).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 239(h) (2006) (Except as explicitly provided herein, nothing in this
part, 42 U.S.C. §§ 239 et seq., shall be construed to override or limit any rights an
individual may have to seek compensation, benefits, or redress under any other provision
of Federal or State law.) I read this to say that after exhaustion the FTCA remedy
survives.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)-(6)(d) (2002).
200. Conk, supra note 181, 479-98.
201. Id.at439-40.
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 (1998).
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failed to disclose risks of vaccination. Such claims would have in
common failure to provide adequate warning of adverse effects. Under
SEPPA, for all such claims, the United States stands in the shoes of the
tortfeasor and insures all without cost to the suppliers or recourse against
them. (This is unlike the Swine Flu campaign, discussed below, in
which the U.S. retained a right of recovery action against negligent
manufacturers of vaccines supplied to the U.S.).
Three Johns Hopkins bioethicists have suggested the government, in
event of bioweapons attack, dispense in an emergency with the burden of
informed consent and offer in its place a program of compensation for
adverse effects in order to obtain wide cooperation without compulsory
vaccination.20 3 Such an exercise of police power would raise a host of
complex and contentious issues, some of constitutional dimension. As
suggested by the discussion below of Petty v. United States,20 4 such an
approach as Faden would, under current law, result in liability against the
United States for failure to respect patient autonomy. In the smallpox
campaign such informed-consent based claims in a mass campaign
would likely have arisen from the incidents of myocarditis and
pericarditis. Despite warning by FDA scientists as early as 2001 that
coronary inflammation (carditis) was a risk of smallpox vaccination, 20 5 it
was not until April 2003 when the campaign was well underway and
such injuries actually appeared-particularly among young soldiers
girding for war-that the FDA Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices warned of the risk.206
The SEPPA, with its limited compensation, likely would not have
stopped a significant number of such claims in a mass campaign. Such
claims would aptly have been addressed to the United States, which
203. Ruth R. Faden, Holly A. Taylor, and Naomi K. Seiler, Consent and
Compensation: A Social Compact, for Smallpox Vaccine Policy in the Event of an Attack,
36 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 549 (2003) (In the event of a widespread biological
attack involving smallpox, it may not only be morally permissible, but morally
obligatory, to dispense with the ordinary requirements of informed consent for
vaccination. The government should also commit to educating the public about the
vaccine, distributing the vaccine efficiently and fairly, and ensuring access to health care
to those who experience adverse events as a result of vaccination. In addition, the
government should provide a program of financial compensation for any persons who
experience permanent disability as a consequence of vaccination and for the families of
those who die as a result of vaccination.).
204. Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984).
205. Steven R. Rosenthal, Michael Merchlinsky, Cynthia Kleppinger & Karen L.
Goldenthal, Developing New Smallpox Vaccines, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 6,
920-24 (2001).
206. See Center for Disease Control, Supplemental Recommendations on Adverse
Events Following Smallpox Vaccine in the Pre-Event Vaccination Program:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 52 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 282 (2003).
[Vol. 112:1
2007] WILL THE POST 9/! 11 WORLD BE A POST-TORT WORLD? 223
purchased the vaccine, prescribed the forms of consent, and, through the
CDC, led the campaign.2 °7 In the Swine Flu campaign liability was
imposed on the United States for its "hard sell" of the influenza vaccine
which minimized risks.
During the 2002-2003 smallpox vaccination campaign the Institute
of Medicine provided a running commentary throughout the smallpox
campaign, issuing a series of "letter reports." In its final report The
Smallpox Vaccination Program-Public Health in an Age of Terrorism,
the IOM observed:
[Tlhere is a tension between maximizing participation of those
appropriate for and consenting to vaccination-those with
appropriate medical and public health responsibilities who are at risk
for infection (should it appear) and without true contraindications
themselves or in close personal contacts-and minimizing
participation by those at high risk for adverse reactions (or in
contact with those at high risk for adverse reactions), or those
who for whatever reasons do not wish to be vaccinated.
208
SEPPA only covers those who were vaccinated with the live variola
virus pursuant to the declaration of the Secretary of Health. The Act
limits coverage to those who receive the vaccine during the period of the
declaration. 209 But the tension to which the IOM refers is a profound and
pervasive public health question, as Professor Wendy Parmet has
recently thoughtfully explored.21 ° In a true mass campaign, such as in an
actual, not a contemplated, emergency, a far more complex set of
considerations would come into play than SEPPA-which involved
volunteers-confronted.
Government can compel vaccination for public health reasons,
relying on the state's right and duty of self-defense. As Justice John
Marshall Harlan famously observed a century ago in a challenge to
compulsory smallpox vaccination, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: "[U]pon
the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has
the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens
the safety of its members. ,
211
But individuals remain entitled to know what risks they are
207. Id.
208. National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, (2005) at 137 (emphasis
added).
209. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Declaration Regarding Administration
of Smallpox Countermeasures, The Smallpox Vaccination Program, Fed. Reg. 4212,
January 28, 2003.
210. Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible
When It Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 71 (2005).
211. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13 (1905).
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incurring-and to seek exclusion from the vaccination. As Justice
Cardozo observed in a case involving a claim made by a woman who
asserted she was operated on without her consent: "Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body. 212
This tension between individual liberty and public necessity is
inescapable in mass or compulsory vaccination campaigns. But contrary
to the suggestions of Faden, et al.213 informed consent need not be a
casualty of public necessity and urgency-and its provision probably
advances the public purpose of widespread cooperation in a mass
vaccination campaign.2 14  As Prosser observed long ago "some
emergencies must be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared to meet
them when he engages in an activity in which they are likely to arise. 215
Compulsory vaccination may compel recognition of an individual
due process right to be heard, as Lawrence Gostin has suggested in the
debate over the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act.21 6 That the
process due in "battlefield conditions" may not be that apt for leisurely
times does not change the duty. It will call first for preparation and
secondly for maximum effort in the moment of crisis. Consent to
injurious vaccination induced by deceit may rise to constitutional
dimensions and may be explored in the kind of constitutional tort action
recognized in Bivens v. FBI.
217
As the IOM noted the tension extends beyond compulsory
vaccination to government-led mass vaccination campaigns. Minimizing
the number who must be vaccinated has much to commend it as
policy.218 Even if the Federal Torts Claims Act did not hold government
actors liable on the same ground as private actors, it might be beyond the
212. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
213. FADEN, ET AL., supra note 203.
214. A subject for historical inquiry is to explore the public education campaign
which enabled the New York City Department of Health to succeed in vaccinating
without coercion 7 million people-80% of the population of New York City-in two
weeks after a 1947 smallpox outbreak. See Frieden, et. al, Cardiac Deaths after a Mass
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign-New York City 1947, 52 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT No. 39 (October 2, 2003).
215. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 95, at § 138.
216. Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are
Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
217. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (This case recognized a constitutional tort action for unreasonable
search of dwelling. Non-informed-consensual vaccination by federal agents may give
rise to a constitutional tort action for invasion of privacy.).
218. See IOM Report, supra note 208, at 17-18 (This report discussed ring
vaccination-in which mass inoculation is avoided, and vaccination is carried out among
the ring of people surrounding the infected person. Surveillance and containment are
options preferred over mass vaccination.).
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power of Congress to bar such an action in tort for deceit, if the
government, by virtue of misleading information, has obtained consent to
bodily invasion. If we recognize the right of recourse as a central
element of civil society, then justification of the incursions on individual
autonomy imposed in the name of emergency requires careful
demonstration not simply of the nature and extent of the emergency but
of the opportunity to plan in advance of its occurrence.
Overreactions such as the 2003 smallpox vaccination campaign
nonetheless provided valuable training regarding the lack of public
health readiness for unexpected microbial attacks, whether natural or
criminal. David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, two of our most
important historians of public health, draw three lessons from 9/11: that
the success of public health responses in New York was due less to
planning than to the strength of its existing, historic infrastructure of
health services, laboratories, and personnel; that we need a much more
expansive understanding of mental health services; and that "failure to
communicate honestly about uncertainty is a big mistake. 2 19
It is far beyond the scope of this paper to resolve these issues of
fundamental rights in conflict when compulsion confronts personal
integrity. But it is important to observe that not every person needs to be
vaccinated in a mass campaign. The New York City 1947 effort
successfully contained the smallpox outbreak with 80% vaccination of
the population-over 6 million people in 28 days.220 But as the IOM
suggests "ring vaccination" may be an effective alternative to mass
vaccination. State laws that permit individual exception to mandatory
vaccination for those at identifiable risk recognize that.2 2 1  Herd
immunity-a barrier against wide spread of contagious disease-is
achieved with less than 100% participation because certain persons are
more likely transmitters of disease, and therefore more important
vaccinees than are others. As a prudential matter, the achievement of a
high degree of participation in a mass campaign for eradication of
disease-and especially in a true emergency-requires trust and
cooperation by citizens. That includes willingness to take risk for the
community good. A wise approach might be to recognize that even
where great risk of disease spread can be identified prudence and
reasonable caution counsel that an individual is entitled to be heard on a
219. See generally DAVID ROSNER AND GERALD MARKOWITZ, ARE WE READY?
PUBLIC HEALTH SINCE 9/11 (2006).
220. T. Frieden, et al.,Centers for Disease Control, Cardiac Deaths After a Mass
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign-New York City, 1947, 52 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 933 (2003).
221. Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and
Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 873-74 (2002).
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claim of exemption even from mandatory mass vaccination.
SEPPA covered a narrow slice. It was a unique program in which
volunteers were elicited for a vaccine which certainly carried risks but no
risk of disease without vaccination could be identified or estimated. In
such circumstances of the most speculative need, there is no reason to
forego the fullest measure of individual choice and informed consent.
Any failure to inform recipients should remain actionable-particularly
against the government architects of the program. In such instances, the
availability of a tort option seems essential to vindicate individual
freedom and to constrain government impulse driven by hysteria or
misplaced ideological fervor, as may have been the case in the
Presidential boost given to smallpox vaccination in the 2003 run-up to
the invasion of Iraq.
In true mass inoculation settings-after the outbreak of an
identifiable potentially pandemic disease222 the hard sell will be more
tempting. That is beyond the scope of this project, except to the extent
that the discussion of the historical experience with swine flu may be
instructive. Underlying the IOM's discussion of "ring strategies" is
recognition of the high value of patient choice and voluntary risk
assumption. Alarmist approaches-like that in the 1976 swine flu
campaign-lead to unnecessary risks of harm. I think it will aid the
clarity and caution with which such issues as emergency pandemic
influenza vaccination are addressed if we see the right of informed
patient autonomy and recourse against wrongdoers as essential parts of
ordered liberty.
B. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005
The funding for development and acquisition of "strategic
stockpiles" by the federal government authorized by BioShield 2004 left
a question: how would we solve the often-bruited problem of vaccine
development, a market from which the giant pharmaceutical companies
have generally shied away. Legislative initiatives focused on promises
of liability protection, extension of patent terms or other exclusive rights,
and anti-trust protections, measures which were said to be necessary
incentives to get "big pharma" to enter the fray to develop and produce
products such as vaccines to counter the feared pandemic of avian
222. See, e.g., Dep't Health and Human Services, Health and Human Services
Pandemic Flu Influenza Plan (November 2005). (Prior to onset the United States will
develop public stockpiles for distribution to health providers anti-viral drugs sufficient to
treat 25% of the U.S. population, according to predetermined priority groupings. At the
onset of a pandemic influenza outbreak the federal government will work with the
pharmaceutical industry to develop an effective vaccine.).
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influenza, or another bioweapon attack like the anthrax incidents.223
If the SEPPA is a saber, narrowly drawn-limited to a single
product with generally well known risks, 224 and for a limited time-then
the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 is a
blunderbuss. PREPA was passed without hearings or mark-up as a rider
to the pre-Christmas defense appropriations bill. Its coverage was
described at its December 30, 2005 signing principally as for the threat
of pandemic avian influenza.225
In fact the Public Readiness Act is far broader than the presidential
signing statement presents. It is not limited to the products in the
"strategic stockpile." The "emergencies" to which its "liability
protections" 226 are provided not only for products used in emergencies in
223. There were no significant legislative studies nor were there extensive hearings to
explore the problem. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
hosted one session on liability protections, patent term extensions, and anti-trust
protections for vaccines, etc. See Roundtable Discussion: Senate Subcommittee on
Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness Title: Roundtable Discussion: When
Terror Strikes-Preparing an Effective and Immediate Public Health Response: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 193 (2005)
July 14, 2005. Audio recording and written statements are available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_07-14_b/2005_07_14 b.html (last visited October
29, 2006).
224. Because smallpox vaccination had not been universal until 1972, when civilian
vaccination ended, a large database was available when vaccinations resumed. Relying
extensively on the classic epidemiological reports of Professor J. Michael Lane, who had
studied smallpox vaccination programs for 50 years, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Policy (ACIP) recommended in June of 2001 that smallpox vaccination
need only resume when an actual terrorist release of the virus was reported. Citing the
risks of vaccine-related illness, the ACIP also recommended development of a new, safer
smallpox vaccine. Reviewing the reported complications associated with first-time
vaccinia vaccination, the ACIP identified the following principal risks: 1) accidental
inoculation (spread from one part of the vaccinee's body to another, or one person to
another) for 529.2 people per million vaccinations; 2) generalized vaccinia (systemic
illness due to the vaccinia virus) for 241.5 million people; 3) eczema vaccinatum (skin
rashes among those with eczema history) for 38.5 million people; 4) progressive vaccinia
(severe necrosis at the vaccination site) for 12.3 million people; and 5) postvaccinial
encephalitis for 12.3 million people. The last two risks were considered potentially fatal.
See Lisa D. Rotz, Debra A. Dotson, Inger K. Damon & John A. Becher, Vaccinia
(Smallpox) Vaccine, Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP), 50 MWWR 1, 1-25 (2001).
225. President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006," 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005)
("Today, I have signed into law H.R. 2863, the 'Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006.' The Act provides resources needed to fight the war on
terror, help citizens of the Gulf States recover from devastating hurricanes, and protect
Americans from a potential influenza pandemic.").
226. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247(d-)(6)(d)(a)(1) (2006) ("Subject to the
other provisions of this section, a covered person shall be immune from suit and liability
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the common sense. It extends to any determination by the Secretary that
"a disease or other health condition or other threat to health constitutes a
public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the disease,
condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency."
227
The statute permits DHHS to grant tort immunity without any
requirement that reasonable care have been used in the development and
manufacture of the product.Even after its unreviewable administrative
approval for emergency use and its designation as a "covered [i.e. tort
immune] countermeasure," PREPA does not require that manufacturers,
designers, or providers continue to study or work to improve the product.
Manufacturing defects, design defects, inadequate warnings, and even
reckless disregard of safety by manufacturers thus are all immunized by
PREPA. 228
PREPA's compensatory provisions adopt those in SEPPA. The act
relies on a table of covered injuries, like SEPPA and NCVICP, discussed
above. But compensation is available only if there is "direct causation of
a covered injury." A covered injury, which is death or serious injury, is
only one listed in a table of "covered injuries" by the Secretary of Health
who may only make such a determination based on "compelling, reliable,
valid, medical and scientific evidence. 229
PREPA's grossly misleading popular name promises "[t]argeted
liability protections for pandemic and epidemic products and security
countermeasures." But it extends its immunizing reach to any product
which is declared a "covered countermeasure" and which is used during
the period of a (non-judicially reviewable) declaration by the Secretary
of Health that
a disease or other health condition or other threat to health constitutes
a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the
disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an
emergency, the Secretary may make a declaration, through
publication in the Federal Register, recommending, under conditions
as the Secretary may specify, the manufacture, testing, development,
distribution, administration, or use of one or more covered
countermeasures, and stating that subsection (a) is in effect with
respect to the activities so recommended.
230
under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of,
relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered
countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued with respect to such
countermeasure.").
227. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act § 247d-6(d)(b).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (b)(1) (2006).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(b)(4) (2006).
230. See id. (emphasis added).
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Subsection (a) provides that during the declaration's effective
period and within the geographic area (which may be a specification that
such subsection applies without geographic limitation) a covered person
shall "be immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with
respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a
covered countermeasure." 23'
Immunity extends to any "qualified pandemic or epidemic product"
that may diagnose, cure, treat, or even "mitigate" any "serious" disease
or condition-even if the product is merely the object of study for
possible use.232 PREPA immunity is gained if the product is used during
the period of the declaration, for a condition and for a population
specified in the declaration, decisions which are unreviewable by any
court.
2 33
There is a "bad actor" exception to PREPA, but one would have to
be a very bad actor to qualify. The Public Readiness Act allows a right
of action only where there is "clear and convincing evidence (of) willful
misconduct by each covered person sued and that such willful
misconduct caused death or serious physical injury." But willful
misconduct may be further limited by regulation and in the event of a
regulated product
such act or omission shall not constitute "willful misconduct" for
purposes of subsection (d) if-
(I) neither the Secretary nor the Attorney General has initiated
an enforcement action with respect to such act or omission; or
(ii) such an enforcement action has been initiated and the action has
been terminated or finally resolved without a covered remedy.
Any action or proceeding under subsection (2d) shall be stayed during
the pendency of such an enforcement action.
In the unlikely event that such conditions have been met, the
Preparedness Act provides that the exclusive action shall be before a
three judge court in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, that there shall be detailed pleading, with medical records and
physicians affidavits attached, and that no discovery shall be permitted
until the defendant(s) have had the opportunity to bring a motion to
231. See 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(a)(l) (2006).
232. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act § 247d-6d(i) (2006).
233. See id. § 247d-6d(b)(7) ("No court of the United States, or of any State, shall
have subject matter jurisdiction to review, whether by mandamus or otherwise, any action
by the Secretary under this subsection.").
234. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(A)(i) (2006).
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235dismiss. And of course there shall be full credit given to such a
wrongdoer for all benefits received from collateral sources.236
Such an "emergency" measure has no precedent in the common law
or in the codifications of the common law principle that reasonable care
is determined based on the exigencies of the circumstances, of which
emergency is one. Emergency has posed no special doctrinal problems
for the law of torts. Emergency has simply been understood to be one of
the facts which must be taken into account in determining what
23constitutes reasonable care under the circumstances. 37 This measure,
which substitutes a highly limited remedy for direct responsibility for
negligence and recklessness by a wide swath of actors-sellers,
manufacturers, professionals, and governmental actors-reveals a deep
distrust of tort law.
Virtually unconditional authority is given to the Secretary of Health
to cloak medical personnel and product manufacturers, sellers, or
providers in immunity. The Secretary need simply declare (without fear
of judicial review) that there is a "credible risk" that a disease, condition
or threat "may in the future constitute such an emergency" threat to
public health.238 There are no criteria, no requirements, no preconditions,
no judicial review for such an administrative determination, and state tort
law is pre-empted.239 The Secretary need merely specify the location, the
duration, the protected population, and the targeted diseases or health
conditions. He then may "recommend ... under [such] conditions as
[he] may specify, the manufacture, testing, development, distribution,
administration, or use of one or more covered countermeasures, and
stating that subsection (a) is in effect with respect to the activities so
recommended.,
240
The passage of the Act is said to provide an incentive to relieve the
fear of liability and spur vaccine production. But the protected products
are not limited to vaccines, for which the lack of recurrent markets may
make problematic underwriting and risk estimation. PREPA authorizes
an unfettered Secretary of Health to immunize use in a declared
emergency of any product that "may mitigate" any disease or
235. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(A) (2006).
236. See id. § 247d-6d(e)(1) (2006) ("Any action under subsection (d) shall be filed
and maintained only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia").
237. DOBBS, supra note 152, at 129-32 (stating, although common law has taken into
account emergency to a circumstance, emergency and Good Samaritan statutes have
sometimes gone far beyond by creating immunities, defenses, or lower standards of care).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)-(6)(d) (2006).
239. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)-
(6)(d)(b)(8) (2006).
240. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
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condition. 24 1 Even in the case of vaccines such incentives as PREPA
provides are the product of long, plaintive cries of wolf at the door. But
Michelle Mello and Troyen Brennan of the Harvard School of Public
Health have demonstrated that the rate of adverse events from influenza
vaccine is low and stable. The product liability and other litigation
arising from the millions of influenza injections given each year is trivial
in number and effect.242
Direct government purchase of vaccine for stockpiling would afford
the manufacturers the government contractor defense, as the
government's selection of materials to buy would likely be seen as a
discretionary decision which provided derivative protection to the seller
who complies with government's discretionary design choices, as in
Boyle v. United Technologies.243 Particularly worrisome is that during
manufacture and stockpiling, but before use, no duty is imposed to
continue to study and test the product so that it meets the usual safety and
efficacy standards. Such stockpiling is under way, funded by the
$6.5 billion Bioshield Act of 2004.244 (Biosafety related government
spending has now reached a total of $36 billion since the anthrax
attacks.) 245  Yet recent press accounts indicate that progress on the
stockpiles on is slow. It is described by Rep. Christopher Shays as "[a]
torturous labyrinth of federal fiefdoms into which billions disappear....
Yet few antidotes have yet to emerge. 24 6
It bears noting that the SAFETY Act of 2002 provides the same
defense to suppliers of "qualified anti-terrorism technology" to the
241. Id.
242. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza
Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA 1729, 1817 (2005) ("Analyzing VAERS data on influenza
vaccine-associated injuries, [the National Vaccine Advisory Committee] NVAC found
that between 1990 and 1995, for every 10 million doses delivered to adults, there were 5
deaths, 30 serious adverse events, and 135 non-serious adverse events. A more recent
analysis determined that 501 instances of GBS were reported to the VAERS from 1990
through June 2003. Reports of GBS declined from 17 cases per 10 million vaccinations
(1993-1994) to 4 cases per 10 million vaccinations (2002-2003). Rates of other adverse
events were stable at about 15 cases per 10 million doses (2002-2003).").
243. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
244. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004) ("The
Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security (referred to in this
section as the 'Homeland Security Secretary'), shall maintain a stockpile or stockpiles of
drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, and other supplies in such
numbers, types, and amounts as are determined by the Secretary to be appropriate and
practicable, taking into account other available sources, to provide for the emergency
health security of the United States, including the emergency health security of children
and other vulnerable populations, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public
health emergency.").
245. Enough Biodefence, NATURE, Nov. 2, 2006.
246. Eric Lipton, Bid to Stockpile Bioterror Drugs Stymied by Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2006. (online edition).
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Department of Homeland Security. That program is now well
underway providing the benefit of that defense to suppliers. 248
PREPA is thus the broadest attack on tort. Though it is limited to
products for which the Secretary of Health has issued a time-limited
(though nothing says how limited) declaration, for use in emergency, and
applies only to such use, it immunizes a wide band of actors and products
without any need to show they exercised reasonable care. Indeed,
reckless disregard is immunized. Once declared a "qualified pandemic
or epidemic product" no duty is imposed on a manufacturer to further
study, test, or develop the product, for which a long period of time may
have elapsed between declaration and "emergency" use. No test of
reasonable care, safety, or efficacy at the time of its designation as a
"qualified" product is required to be shown to the Secretary, who may,
unreviewably, recommend it for designated purposes the breadth of
which lies in the Secretary's sole discretion.
Though the practical impact of PREPA cannot yet be known, the
measure has broad potential to immunize negligent and reckless conduct
because it can be used to immunize the makers vaccines, drugs,
biologics, and medical devices regardless of their degree of testing,
safety and efficacy, even if reasonable efforts to assure safety were made
neither before nor after the designation of the product as a "qualified
pandemic or epidemic product." It is therefore not surprising that there
is pending a measure which would repeal the PREPA.
C. Counterpoint to PREPA-S. 2291-The Responsible Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
Senators Kennedy, Dodd, Harkin and Bingaman have proposed
repeal of the Public Readiness Act. Their measure, S. 2291, titled the
"Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act," was
introduced in the 1 0 9 th Congress.
249  It would create the National
Biodefense Injury Program. It too would indemnify manufacturers and
administrators of certain "covered countermeasures" and creates an
administrative remedy, and a tort option. 250  Except for the "grossly
247. SAFETY Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441-44 (2002) (providing DHS suppliers
with federal preemption, an exclusive federal remedy, and the government contractor
defense).
248. See Dep't Health Human Services Act, https://www.safetyact.gov (last accessed
June 27, 2007).
249. Despite declarations of intent by the Democratic Senate leadership, the measure
has not yet been reintroduced in the 110th Congress. See Responsible Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act, S. 2291, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter RPREP].
250. Id.
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negligent, reckless and willful wrongdoers, 22 ' the government honors
the right of civil recourse, it indemnifies, assumes all liability, and stands
in the place of makers, sellers, and administrators of the approved
measures
regardless of whether-(I) the cause of action seeking compensation
is alleged as negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, failure to
warn, 10 or other action; or (ii) the covered countermeasure is
designated as a qualified anti-terrorism technology under the
SAFETY Act (6 U.S.C. 441 et seq.).
2 5 2
S. 2291's range of "covered countermeasures" is far narrower than
PREPA's. Protection is afforded only to smallpox vaccine or a drug that
the Secretary determines to be a priority ... to treat, identify, or
prevent harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear
agent identified as a material threat . . . or to treat, identify, or
prevent harm from a condition that may result in adverse health
consequences or death and may be caused by administering a drug,
biological product, or device against such an agent; ... or is
authorized for emergency use under [21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3] of the
253
Federal food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ... so long as the
manufacturer of such drug, biological product, or device has-(AA)
made all reasonable efforts to obtain applicable approval, clearance,
or licensure; and (BB) cooperated fully with the requirements of the
Secretary under [the Emergency Use Amendments], or (bb) approved
or licensed solely pursuant to (21 CFR 314.1, et seq.) [applications or
abbreviated new drug applications]; and (1II) is specified in a
declaration under paragraph (2).254
251. See id. § 4.
252. See id. § 4 (proposing the addition of Subsection (D), which states "'Liability of
the United States-The United States shall be liable under this subsection with respect to
a claim arising out of the manufacture, distribution, or administration of a covered
countermeasure regardless of whether (i) the cause of action seeking compensation is
alleged as negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, failure to warn, or other action;
or (ii) the covered countermeasure is designated as a qualified anti-terrorism technology
under the SAFETY Act (6 U.S.C. 441 et seq.) (2006)."' Additionally, the Act proposes
the addition of Subsection (E), which states "'GOVERNING LAW-Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 1346(b)(1) and chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, as
they relate to governing law, the liability of the United States as provided in this
subsection shall be in accordance with the law of the place of injury.").
253. See Authorization of Emergency Use of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed for
Prevention of Inhalation Anthrax by Individuals at Heightened Risk of Exposure Due to
Attack With Anthrax; Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 5452 (Feb. 2, 2005).
254. REREP, supra note 249, at § 4 (titled "Indemnification for Manufacturers and
Health Care Professionals Who Administer Medical Products Needed for Biodefense,"
which would amend Section 224(p) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 233(p)))
(emphasis added).
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S. 2291's promise of compensation is much more reliable than that
of the PREPA because the draft Act specifically directs that the National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine (1OM) be hired to make
determinations of what injuries should be included in the table of injuries
by using the "best available evidence ' 255 rather than affording
compensation only in the face of "compelling, reliable, valid, medical
and scientific evidence," as the Public Readiness Act provides. The
requirement of "compelling" evidence is sure to narrow the scope of
table injuries recognized under PREPA.
S. 2291 is designed to restore the ability to challenge the conduct of
actors as to its reasonableness, as the law of torts customarily provides.
It is recognition, unfortunately by a legislative minority, that ordinary
care is an obligation of citizenship, and that recourse against those who
fail that measure, is a right of citizenship.
D. Whom Should We Compensate?
S. 2291 's narrow scope, with its emphasis on "priority" products, is
complemented by greater clarity of purpose: not only to encourage
production, distribution and administration of such measures by
protecting them from liability, but also to "(t)o encourage individuals to
consent to the administration of a covered countermeasure by providing
adequate and just compensation for damages related to death and such
injuries, disabilities, illnesses, or conditions.,
256
The phrase "encourage individuals to consent" makes the point that
the compensation offered here is a prudential benefit to advance the
public health, not a payment meant to compensate for injury wrongly
inflicted. Rather, it is intended to achieve benefits such as herd
immunity, the principle that every person who is vaccinated aids the rest
of the community because she is no longer a source of disease replication
and transmission.257  In order to encourage such cooperation,
compensation is offered. S. 2291 makes clear that this is not tort
damages but rather prudential compensation to encourage voluntary
compliance with a course of action that may benefit others while
258carrying some risks to the volunteer.
255. Id. at § 3(a)(4), (entitled "Injury Table," and discusses evidence this way: "[T]he
best available evidence, including information from adverse event reporting or other
monitoring of those individuals who were administered the countermeasure, whether
evidence from clinical trials or other scientific studies in humans is available.").
256. Id. at § (B)iii.
257. Arthur Allen, For the Good of the Herd, op-ed, N.Y.TIMES, January 25, 2007, A.
258. RPEP at § 3(a)(4)(B)(iii)(lI) (titled "Program Goals," and seeks to "encourage
individuals to consent to the administration of a covered countermeasure by providing
adequate and just compensation for damages related to death and such injuries,
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The authors of PREPA did not recognize this distinction. The
Public Readiness Act is over-broad, both in its immunity provisions and
in whom it compensates. Emergency circumstances affect not the
standard of care; but rather, what it is reasonably possible to deliver in
the circumstances. Thus the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act provides for
Emergency Use Authorizations and other regulatory relief, such as
permitting Accelerated New Drug Approval, which depart from
customary measures of safety and effectiveness such as clinical trials,
allowing animal and laboratory studies to serve as a basis for emergency
use or accelerated approval.2 59  Such permission to use when
appropriately granted will lead to greater adverse effects than longer
study would prevent. But, assuming genuinely informed consent, and
ongoing responsible stewardship by developers and manufacturers to
address safety and efficacy issues, these are not tortious injuries. We
have no obligation to compensate those sickened by adverse effects
suffered due to such reasonable emergency approvals.
The now venerable § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, in
Comment K, makes a plain statement of the rule: so long as there is
reasonable warning of irremediable dangers there is no liability.260 S.
2291 properly frames its relief as a matter of public health-based
incentives, to "encourage" people to take advantage and to assume the
risks of such measures. If we are to defend tort we should defend tort
principles, and that is that compensation is owed only to those who have
suffered a wrong. Other compensation should be recognized as a benefit
to those who assume risk to advance a public purpose.
Those injured by products properly authorized for emergency use,
properly manufactured products, the limited testing of which is justified
by exigent circumstances as described in the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act,
and for which the recipient's informed consent has been given,26 1 have
not been wronged-unless, as S. 2291 recognizes, the manufacturer has
failed to continue to study its products and to advance testing to obtain
full regulatory approval. That affirmative duty, well-recognized in tort
law, is spurned by PREPA's immunizing Secretarial wand.2 62 The only
such product approved to date, AVA anthrax vaccine, is seen in the
FDA's authorization 263 to be the subject of good faith and extensive
disabilities, illnesses, or conditions.").
259. 21 C.F.R. § 314.101, et seq (2007).
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, cmt. K (1977).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2007).
262. When an actor's prior conduct, even though not tortious, creates a continuing
risk of physical harm of a type characteristic of the conduct, the actor has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 39 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
263. See Authorization of Emergency Use of Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed for
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consideration of the special circumstances presented by the threat of an
attack using weaponized anthrax.
PREPA fails not only to require the kind of findings provided in the
Emergency Use Authorization act but it also does not make clear the
basis for its offer of compensation. It confuses tort-replacement
remedies and public health benefits with tort forgiveness. S. 2291
explains that its compensation mechanism is due to the need to
encourage compliance with public health measures which present risks
beyond the ordinary.264 Compensation without a wrong is foreign to tort.
When we choose for policy reasons to afford it we should make clear, as
does S. 2291, why we are departing from the tort norm.
V. Historic Experience with Pandemic Flu Prophylaxis-The Swine
Flu Experience and the Federal Tort Claims Act
Even PREPA does not immunize the United States. It works no
repeal of the Federal Tort Claims Act. If drugs or vaccines in the
national strategic stockpile are supplied by it for use the United States
will remain potentially liable for the defects in those products on the
basis provided in the FTCA. In a genuine large scale emergency, the
drugs and vaccines stockpiled will have been purchased by the
government, allowing suppliers the government contractor defense even
if PREPA is repealed. Since the basis for government liability is
negligence, or another basis on which a private person would be liable,
there are few doctrinal constraints on government liability (other than the
discretionary action exception), especially since the widespread view is
that product liability law has merged with the general body of negligence
law.265 This invites a review of the last time we confronted a potential
outbreak of pandemic influenza-and our response to it which was for
the government to assume all liability under the Tort Claims Act.
In 1976 the federal government undertook to vaccinate the entire
Prevention of Inhalation Anthrax by Individuals at Heightened Risk of Exposure Due to
Attack With Anthrax, 70 Fed. Reg. at 5452 (Feb. 2, 2005).
264. § (b) iii.
265. See, e.g. Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow,
MARQ. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007); DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 355 (2000)
("[C]ourts have now generally adopted a risk-utility test to determine whether a harmful
design is also a defective design. When the risk utility test is applied, the courts seem to
be requiring negligence or at least some similar species of fault."); William Powers, Jr., A
Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639, 654
(1991) ("[C]ourts have had to expend considerable energy trying to explain how
defectiveness under risk-utility differs from negligence. The effort has been far from
successful."); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
819, 824 (1992) ("Products designs are currently regulated under a negligence test: a
design is defective if, in the opinion of the jury, the design creates risks in excess of
benefits.").
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population but halted the effort after 45 million had been vaccinated
when the outbreak proved limited and unexpected complications arose.
The United States required insurance from the vaccine manufacturers it
immunized in case their manufacture was negligent or in breach of
contract. The United States accepted liability for the most serious and
unpredicted injuries, litigated other claims on the basis of prevailing
(state) product liability law, and was found liable for inadequacies in its
"hard sell," minimally informative "informed consent" forms.. 26 6 The
claims were all handled under the Federal Tort Claims Act, thus
embracing state tort law, and recognizing the right of civil recourse for
267wrongdoing. Despite the apparent emergency which impelled the
campaign, the United States sought for itself no immunity beyond its
ordinary protection under the Federal Tort Claims Act for discretionary
acts.
When a cluster of especially virulent influenza cases appeared
among soldiers at Ft. Dix, New Jersey in 1976, public health scientists
identified the new strain as a swine flu-a strain of influenza genetically
similar to that which caused the world-wide influenza pandemic of 1918.
President Gerald Ford, at the urging of the Center for Disease Control
[CDC], announced the government would "immunize 200 million
Americans"-the entire population-against the Swine flu, the Avian flu
pandemic threat of the day. In the end 45 million civilians and 2.5
million soldiers and dependents received the vaccine from October
through mid-December, 1976.26 s
The program was slowed by a variety of problems including late
delivery of vaccine and the non-appearance of new cases of the Swine flu
strain that had prompted the campaign. But the coup de grace was
delivered when Guillain-Barre Syndrome, a rare paralytic disease, began
to appear among vaccinees. Eventually the rate among vaccinees was
shown to be 8.3/million/month compared to 0.7/million/month in the
general population. Though the cases were few, the "relative risk" was
high. When the trend first appeared-thanks to active surveillance by
health officials who had not expected to see the complication-the CDC
quickly concluded that the vaccination campaign should halt.269
150 million doses of vaccine had been ordered. The four
manufacturers-Merck, Sharp, Wyeth and Parke Davis-were paid
$54,000,000 for the vaccine itself. The government absorbed as part of
the purchase price the manufacturers' insurance premiums for
266. See infra discussion of Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 2674-2680 (2002).
268. ARTHUR M. SILVERSTEIN, PURE POLITICS AND IMPURE SCIENCE-THE SWINE FLU
AFFAIR, 113, et passim (1981).
269. Id. at 120-124.
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$55,000,000 in product liability insurance, and advanced an escrow of
$10 million for the $2.5 million self insured retention of each insured.
The total budget for the campaign was $135,000,000.270
A. Swine Flu Vaccine Product Liability Claims
In the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Congress
immunized the vaccine manufacturers for all claims but the
government's own. 271  The United States stood in the manufacturers
place and assumed defense and indemnification of all liability claims,
defending under the Federal Tort Claims Act.272 Standing in the shoes of
the vaccine makers and all program participants 273 the government
agreed that
(2)(A) The United States shall be liable with respect to claims
submitted after September 30, 1976 for personal injury or death
arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine under the swine
270. Government Accountability Office, Report B-164031(5), 58 Comp. Gen. 321
(1979) (reporting on the Swine Flu immunization effort) [hereinafter GAO].
271. Public Law 94-380 amended Section 317 of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 247b). The statute was repealed by Public Law 95-626, § 202, 92 Stat. 3574
(1978), 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1978). See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976).
272. The FTCA grants original jurisdiction to the District Courts, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 provided that the United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages. If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of
the place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in
lieu thereof. With respect to any claim under this chapter [28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.], the
United States shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative
immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United
States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to
which the United States is entitled. See Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(2007).
273. The National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 states "(B) For purposes
of this subsection, the term 'program participant' as to any particular claim means the
manufacturer or distributor of the swine flu vaccine used in an inoculation under the
swine flu program, the public or private agency or organization that provided an
inoculation under the swine flu program without charge for such vaccine or its
administration and in compliance with the informed consent form and procedures
requirements prescribed pursuant to subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
and the medical and other health personnel who provided or assisted in providing an
inoculation under the swine flu program without charge for such vaccine or its
administration and in compliance with such informed consent form and procedures
requirements." See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976).
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flu program and based upon the act or omission of a program
participant in the same manner and to the same extent as the United
States would be liable in any other action brought against it under
such section 1346( b) and chapter 17 1, except that
(I) the liability of the United States arising out of the act or
omission of a program participant may be based on any theory
of liability that would govern an action against such program
participant under the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach
of warranty.
2 7 4
Little risk was expected when the program began. But the Swine
flu vaccine was designed to address a major antigenic switch in the
structure of the influenza virus, and with such change came the
possibility of new complications of inoculation caused by the new
vaccine. In the five years before 1976, some 70 million flu shots had
been administered. Only twenty lawsuits alleging adverse effects had
been filed, and the largest settlement had been for $26,000.275 Liability
became a major issue when the paralytic Guillain-Barre disease
unexpectedly appeared to be associated with the new vaccine.
Ultimately, in 13 years of litigation, the government paid $90 million in
settlement of 5,800 claims for complications of the vaccine.276 Defense
costs were doubtless substantial, although the GAO found insufficient
data to calculate the costs.
277
On June 19, 1978, though there was little evidence that Guillain
Barre syndrome should have been anticipated, the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph Califano,
announced that claimants would not need to establish negligence in order
to recover. This allowed recovery for those who could prove that they
suffered from Guillain-Barre soon after vaccination. A principal reason
for this decision was that the consent form, prepared by the government
for this program, did not warn consumers about a possible risk of
developing Guillain-Barre syndrome.2 78
274. The National Swine Flu Immunization Program Act amends Section 317 of the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247(b). See id.
275. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 268, at 62.
276. $55 million worth of coverage above a self-insured amount of $2.5 million
against such claims to each manufacturer. (The government paid the insurance premiums
and advanced the $2.5 million for self insurance to each of the manufacturers. These
advances were returned to the government in 1985.) Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine
Compensation Schemes, 45 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 477, 478 (1990).
277. GAO, supra note 270, at 321.
278. The following matters were discussed by the Court of Appeals in Unthank v.
United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1520 (10th Cir. 1984). First, the appellate court, along
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Although the government elected to pay GBS claims, it is doubtful
that the claims would have been paid if contemporary product liability
law applied. The products apparently met all specifications and no case
suggests there was any defect that caused the unexpected occurrences.
Epidemiological evidence before the vaccination program did not predict
the hazard, though it is now recognized as a rare complication. 279  But
given the history of flu vaccine safety and the intensity and character of
the government's public relations campaign for its intended vaccination
of every man, woman, and child,28° liability in the form of the reasonable
expectations of the consumer test may well have entitled vaccinees to
recovery. Such liability would best be understood as warranty-based,
grounded on the broad assurances of product safety.28'
with the trial court, was impressed with the statement of Congressman Paul G. Rogers of
Florida, stating "We have asked the drug companies to produce this vaccine. We have
told them how to do it. We have told them the dosage we want, what strength. We gave
them the specifications because we are the only buyers, the Government of the United
States. This is not the usual process of going out and selling. But if someone is hurt, we
think people ought to have a remedy." Unthank v. United States II, 732 F.2d at 1520
(quoting Unthank v. United States I, 533 F. Supp. 703, 719 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Second, the appellate court stated that
[t]he trial court also accurately noted that in response to the outbreak of GBS,
then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
responded to the difficulties experienced after the administration of the
program and the eruption of litigation. He declared that with respect to those
alleging GBS, the policy of the government was to provide compensation to all
who contracted GBS from the swine flu vaccine. Secretary Califano stated that
those who contract GBS: [w]ill not need to prove negligence by Federal
workers or others in the Swine Flu Program as required by Federal law and the
law in many states. Instead claimants in most cases need to show only that they
in fact developed Guillain-Barre as a result of a Swine Flu vaccination and
suffered the alleged damage as a result of that condition.
See id. Finally, the appellate court noted that the Secretary gave two reasons for this
policy:
(1) First, the informed consent form ... did not warn individuals that there was
a one in one hundred thousand risk that a person receiving a flu shot would
contract Guillain-Barre and that one in every two million would die from the
condition.... (2) Second, in the Swine Flu program, the Federal Government,
in an unprecedented effort, actively urged millions of Americans to get flu
vaccination shots and funded the nationwide campaign. Thus we have decided
to provide just compensation for those who contracted Guillain-Barre as a
result of the Swine Flu program rather than force many individuals to prove
government negligence in protracted proceedings.
See id. (emphasis added).
279. See MELLO AND BRENNAN, supra note 242, at 17-18.
280. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 268, at 84-86.
281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (1998) (discussing the origins of
modem strict product liability law as the merger of tort and contract concepts of
warranty); see id. § 3 (discussing the malfunction doctrine-that one can infer the
existence of a defect from the malfunctioning of a familiar object-such as the new car
the steering mechanism of which fails shortly after purchase).
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As Silverstein reports, the CDC, the Advisory Committee on
Immigration Practices (ACIP), the National Institute of Allergies and
Infectious Disease, and the FDA Bureau of Biologics found in the
clinical trials a rate of adverse reactions essentially the same as that of
the control group that received placebo. But the trial was not without
flaws and the program not without critics.
Clinical trials had gone generally well, but the planned dose of the
vaccine was effective in only half of young adults who had not been
primed by natural exposure to influenza. None of the viruses tested was
effective at safe doses in children aged 3 to 10, a prime source of spread
of disease. Program planners could elect a higher more dangerous dose
or a second "booster" shot. Dissenting voices-like Dr. Sidney Wolfe,
now of Public Citizen (then the Health Research Group), and J. Anthony
Morris, a dissenting research virologist at the Bureau of Biologics-
opposed the program. Some, like Dr. Martin Goldfield of the New
Jersey Department of Health, called for stockpiling rather than
immunization. But polio pioneers Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin, who
agreed on little else, enthusiastically endorsed the mass immunization
campaign. They stood by the President's side when he announced the
program.
282
The program had other problems-including doubts about the
effectiveness of the surveillance program for adverse effects-an issue
that is with us today, despite calls after the Swine flu Campaign to study
improvements of the system of adverse event reporting and measures of
program effectiveness.2 83 The unity would be short lived, as Sabin came
to endorse stockpiling rather than immunization-a contrast with his
stance on polio vaccine where he justified the risks of his oral live
attenuated-virus vaccine against the risk-free but possibly less effective
Salk injected killed virus vaccine.284
Looking back at the program-its costs, failures and successes-it
is fair to ask if the swine flu campaigns were best understood as product
liability claims in which the government absorbed liability simply as an
insurer of manufacturers of defective products, or if the liability was
properly the government's own. Against manufacturer liability and for
public liability are that:
- there appear to have been no manufacturing defects,
- the vaccine type (a killed virus) was specified by the government,
282. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 268, at 84-86.
283. Id. at47-49.
284. Government Accountability Office, Report B-198648, 58 Comp. Gen. 321
(1980).
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which exercised broad control of the program,
- the campaign to vaccinate the entire population on an uncertain
predictive foundation-was the government's own precautionary
public health plan, not the product of a marketing scheme for a
product of unproven merit
- the failure to warn of GBS appears not to have been negligent-
based on previous experience with influenza vaccination, and given
that the conventional small-size of the clinical trial sample is unlikely
to turn up an effect as infrequent as GBS's 8.3/million vaccinees/
month.
In the end, the government recovered its deposit for the deductibles
and made no claims against the manufacturers' insurers. This does not
appear to be due to soft-headedness or to pro-big-business bias, or to
government ambivalence about the tort system. Rather it was grounded
in Secretary Califano's 1978 executive decision that achievement of the
government's goal of effective prevention of an influenza pandemic
required recognition of the claims of those who suffered the unexpected
injury of Guillain Barre Syndrome. He decided that burden properly
belonged with government-as a matter of retention of public trust, at
least, if not of product liability law.
285
In the swine flu cases, the United States accepted responsibility for
Guillain Barre Syndrome cases, for the risks of paralytic injury posed by
the decision to inoculate virtually the entire population.286 But only in
the GBS cases did the government concede liability. In every other case,
liability was contested. And as time went on, courts in the 1980's came
to decisively reject strict liability where the harm suffered could not have
been foreseen.287 They rejected decisions that rejected the "state of the
art" defense such as the New Jersey asbestos case Beshada v. Johns
Manville,288  and embraced the essentially negligence-based
characterization of product liability that dominates courts' practice
today.289 Swine Flu Act claims were denied for illnesses that were not
recognized as complications at the time the Swine Flu vaccine was
administered and which were therefore not a complication with which a
285. See id.; see generally SILVERSTEIN, supra note 268.
286. See Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 477, 478 (1990).
287. See Brazzel v. United States, 880 F.2d 84 (8th. Cir. 1998).
288. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 196 (1982). Beshada itself
was promptly limited to its asbestos-based facts in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97
N.J. 429 (1984).
289. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §2, cmt. d, f. (1998).
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duty to warn could be imposed under the "state of the art" defenses
which required proof that the complication was foreseeable.29°
In the 1970's and early 1980's many embraced the so-called Wade-
Keeton rule, which imposed on defendants knowledge of the harmful
propensities which a product was shown to have at time of trial, not at
the time of production.291 This was in tension with the foundational
document of the product liability movement-the Restatement 2d's
§ 402A, which in "comment k" declared that a useful but unavoidably
unsafe product such as the rabies vaccine was not defective so long as it
contained adequate warnings to the user. The obligation to warn implied
that available knowledge was sufficient to identify the risk. Despite the
absence of evidence of lack of foreseeability of paralytic Guillaine Barre
Syndrome, the government conceded liability. 292 The litigation centered
on matters of fact-whether the claimant suffered from GBS and
whether her infirmities were caused by the vaccine.2 93
But where other maladies were alleged, plaintiffs had to prove to
increasingly skeptical courts that the product was defective-that the
dangers had been knowable but had not been made known. Thus
plaintiff failed in Freeman v. United States,294 where Texas law was
found to require foreseeability of injury, which plaintiff had not shown,
for adhesive capsulitis alleged to have been caused by swine flu
vaccination. Similarly in Brasil v. U.S., the Court of Appeals held that
Iowa law barred recovery for myalgia by a swine flu recipient because
the duty to warn did not extend to unforeseeable risks posed by a
product.
295
B. Hard Sell: The Federal Tort Claims Act-An Independent Basis for
Tort Liability of the United States Based on its Failure to Assure
Informed Consent
The stance of Congressman Rogers and Secretary Califano
regarding GB S296 should not be understood as anomalous as it might
appear at first blush. Rather, it demonstrates recognition that there was
290. See Brazzell, infra note 295.
291. Wade Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV.
398, 407-08 (1970) ("The imputation of knowledge is a legal fiction. It is another way of
saying that for purposes of strict liability the defendant's knowledge of the danger is
irrelevant.").
292. Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Systems, 45 FOOD DRUG. CosM. L.J.
477,478 (1990).
293. See Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that, in
swine flu vaccine/GBS cases, only causation and damages are an issue).
294. See Freeman v. United States, 704 F.2d 154, 159 (5th Cir. 1983).
295. See Brazzell v. United States, 880 F.2d 84, 87 (8th Cir. 1989).
296. See Unthank II, 732 F.2d at 1520.
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an independent basis for liability against the United States based on the
hard sell that was adopted in order to accomplish the presidentially-
embraced goal of inoculating every American.
The Swine Flu case, Petty v. United States, reminds us that the
conduct of the United States itself is subject to scrutiny under the Federal
Tort Claims Act-which looks to state tort law for principles of liability.
Petty is not a GBS case, but rather a "serum sickness" case. The case
demonstrates that an FTCA mass inoculation claim against government
itself can be competently handled by ordinary tort principles derived
from state law. Petty shows the vigor of the tort principle of civil
recourse in such circumstances against a wrongdoer-even when that
wrongdoer is a governmental agency.297
The swine flu cases, like the U.K. hepatitis C-contaminated blood
cases discussed below, demonstrate that pandemic and epidemic counter-
measure cases can be competently handled by ordinary principles of tort
liability as expressed in the Federal Tort Claims Act, which makes the
United States liable to the same extent as a private person for non-
discretionary acts.
The Swine Flu Act placed the United States in the shoes of the
vaccine manufacturers and administrators, exposing it to claims on the
same bases as the manufacturers would have been-negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty.298 But there was another basis for
liability-and that was not derivative or vicarious. Rather, the
negligence was that of the United States itself. In Petty the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the finding of the District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa that the United States itself had been negligent-because it had
engaged in a "hard sell" of the Swine Flu vaccine. In order to achieve
the government's presidentially declared goal of inoculating every man,
woman, and child in the country, the public health authorities had
deliberately downplayed risks.299
The Swine Flu Act directed that an informed consent form be
developed. But the form was singularly uninformative. 30 0  It was no
297. See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984).
298. See Manko, 830 F.2d at 834.
299. See Petty, 740 F.2d at 1436.






People with fever should delay getting vaccinated until the fever is gone.
People who have received another type of vaccine in the past 14 days should
consult a physician before taking the flu vaccine.
If you have any questions about flu or flu vaccine, please ask.
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accident. The District Court had found that the government's "hardsell"
approach to immunization had the natural effect of firmly planting within
the recipient's mind the imperative need for receiving the shot. The
approach taken by those charged with the administration of this program
had the "distinct effect of de-emphasizing the importance of making
individual determinations as to the advisability of undergoing the risks of
immunization." This, it found was incompatible with the Iowa law
regarding informed consent-to which the Federal Tort Claims Act
bound federal agents.3 ° '
The Court of Appeals concurred. It observed:
Dr. Hattwick, Director of the National Influenza Immunization
Program, Surveillance and Assessment Center, and on the Center for
Disease Control staff of the Bureau of Epidemiology, testified that
phraseology decisions were made "to encourage participation."
Because those in charge were clearly aware of the specific
neurological risks, it was Dr. Hattwick's assessment that they must
have determined that it was more prudent not to mention or stress
these risks. He testified that more specificity could have been
confusing, by which he meant that participation would have been
hampered. Dr. Katz, a Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Yale
University, also testified that the warning was an attempt to induce
participation and was inadequate to enable recipients to render an
informed consent. On the basis of this testimony, the court could find
that under Iowa law, the government's information 3form
inadequately warned the specific, known risk of serum sickness.
The District Court had explained that
Under Iowa law, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in
conjunction with the Center for Disease Control and the Bureau of
Biologics, had a duty to warn prospective recipients of the swine flu
vaccination of all reasonably foreseeable dangers.
A duty to warn depends on superior knowledge and is said to exist
when one may reasonably foresee danger of injury or damage to one
less knowledgeable unless adequate warning of danger is given. It is
this reasonable foreseeability which triggers the obligation to warn,
which must be determined by the circumstances of each case.
303
We see in Petty the strength of common law principles of liability
and recourse encompassed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. The battle
Id. at 1436.
301. Petty v. U.S., 592 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
302. Petty, 740 F.2d at 1436 (emphasis added).
303. Lakatosh v. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W. 2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973).
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ground will often be over where to draw the line on the
discretionary/ministerial function discretion. But in Petty, the Court of
Appeals for the 8th Circuit suggests that it will not be drawn so as to
preempt the basic principles of self-determination embraced by state tort
law in Iowa-and throughout the country.3 °4
How informative the government must be will be founded on
ordinary principles of tort law-drawn from medical malpractice and
product liability law which has been highly elaborated by courts around
the country. Of course that will mean that there is not uniformity-thus
we have the contrast between states like New Jersey which adopt a
rebuttable presumption that compliance with FDA labeling is sufficient,
and Michigan which establishes a conclusive presumption-compliance
with FDA approved labeling is a complete defense in a failure to warn
case.
30 5
The liability of the United States was properly limited, and the
integrity of the system of civil recourse preserved in the Swine Flu Act.
The suppliers insurance premiums were not to indemnify and defend
against injured swine flu vaccinees. For that it was the treasury of the
United States which was exposed.30 6 The manufacturers were insured
against the government's statutory right of subrogation for negligence or
breach of contract by the vaccine manufacturers, who were to produce
the stockpile.30 7 The underwriting difficulties for the swine flu influenza
vaccine were apparent: the product was new, having been adapted to the
new virus, and the intended to be universal. Pricing the product,
including its projected liability costs, was obviously difficult. The
government was the sole purchaser. It would determine the cost. And
part of that cost was properly determined to be the costs of self-
insurance.30 8
By accepting all liability (except for contract breach and mis-
manufacture) the government placed itself in a posture which invited the
trust of the citizenry which it asked to take a risk, individually usually
quite low, but which benefited others and the public as a whole. By
being vaccinated each person, knowingly or not, contributed to the
welfare of others when he or she took the risk of being vaccinated.
In the circumstances of the Swine flu campaign the legitimate
304. Id.
305. Rowe v. Hoffman LaRoche, 2007 N.J. LEXIS 334; Alli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 854
N.E.2d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing differences between New Jersey, Indiana,
and Michigan law regarding effect of evidence of compliance with FDA labeling
provisions).
306. Lakatosh v. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W. 2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973).
307. Id.
308. SILVERSTEIN, passim supra note 268.
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expectation of the consumer was that the product was safe, certainly that
it did not present the risk, and the consumer was not being asked to
assume the risk, of a paralytic condition. In this instance, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (as it was then known)
decided that the consequence of lack of knowledge of the scientific
community was for the government to bear, as its undertaking imposed
that risk upon the public.
We thus see in the Swine Flu campaign that the Federal Tort Claims
Act retains vitality and that it incorporates the flexibility of underlying
state common law and thus captures even the force of the consumer
expectation test-which is, as Mark Geistfeld has argued, compatible
with the general risk utility approach of product liability law because the
risk utility test expresses what the consumer is reasonably entitled to
expect.3 °9
Looking back at the Swine flu experience we can also ask whether
the liability imposed is properly described as tort liability or social
insurance. It was in fact both. Acceptance of the claims of those who
suffered from Guillain Barre Syndrome may be understood as a public
health driven incentive, a form of social insurance or as tort liability
payments due to unreasonable minimization of risk in the hard-sell
government campaign. But those who suffered from injuries, the risk of
which there was not adequate warning, though current capability
permitted it, were victims of tortious conduct who recovered in tort. The
United States, however, did not offer an incentive to join in a public
health measure. That innovation came with the National Childhood
Vaccine Compensation Act.31°
Under the Bioshield Act, the development of the strategic national
stockpiles will make the United States not only purchaser and distributor
but also designer of vaccines and medications stockpiled for use in large
scale emergencies. 311  The Swine Flu Act cases show us that the
government's direct liability as distributor and as the provider for
information to users will make it rather than manufacturers the prime
defendant. Manufacturing defects will be the subject of breach of
contract actions by government against manufacturers, if PREPA is not
repealed.
The government itself will be liable if the product distributed does
not comply with its own specifications. Design defect claims may be
barred if such choices are seen as discretionary. But since the adequacy
of warnings is the main thrust of drug product liability litigation, the
309. MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2006).
310. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W. 2d at 913 (Iowa 1973).
311. Id.
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possible loss of design defect claims for stockpiled products will have
little effect, since for drugs and vaccines the candle is generally with the
warnings game. 312 The Federal Tort Claims Act stands as a bulwark of
tort and makes the common law of tort the governing standard for any
epidemic of adverse effects which arises within the epidemic for which
drugs, vaccines, and devices in the national stockpile are deployed.
C. Bad Blood in Britain: What Is a Citizen Entitled to Expect About
Drug, Vaccine and Biological Product Safety?
The Swine Flu cases [the GBS special case aside], like product
liability law generally, embraced a requirement that the adverse effects
must be knowable to impose a duty to warn. There is no doubt that is a
bedrock principle. But Petty makes clear that manner of presentation
matters, and that through the FTCA ordinary negligence liability against
government itself remains the law, despite the chipping away of the
bases for liability against private manufacturers presented by the Public
Readiness Act and other measures. In the British contaminated blood
cases, the National Blood Authority was found to have been tardy in
adopting a test for hepatitis C contamination. We see in that case an
instructive model for direct government liability under the tort claims act
if an available safer vaccine design is not adopted (e.g. a failure-as with
polio vaccine-to switch from oral live-virus to safer injected killed
virus for two decades after bio-equivalency of enhanced killed virus
vaccine had been established). Along with Petty, the blood cases show
us of the vitality and importance of tort actions against government when
fault is not derivative, but rather that of government itself.
When Chiron Corporation developed a new test that could
determine the presence of hepatitis C anti-bodies in donated blood, the
U.S. and Japan adopted the new test as a norm almost immediately.
Chiron obtained its export license in November 1989. But, unlike the
U.S. and Japan, which adopted the test quickly, the British National
Blood Authority dallied over a year before requiring the test in January
1991. Patients infected in the interim sued-and prevailed.313
How safe does the consumer have a right to expect a drug, vaccine,
or medical device to be? It was put by Judge Michael Burton in the
English hepatitis C contaminated blood cases:
"the question is what the legitimate expectation is of persons
generally, i.e., what is legitimately to be expected, arrived at
312. DAVID G. OWEN, HANDBOOK OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 9.6 (2004).
313. A and Others v. National Blood Authority, QB [2001] 3 All ER 289.
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objectively." 31 4  That is, we determine not what the consumer
actually expects but what is the reasonable entitlement of the
consumer. For that the circumstances are to be examined, in classic
negligence manner.
Burton's handling of the contaminated blood cases is more conduct-
centered and less wooden than our product liability case analyses often
are. His approach is an apt one for the swine flu campaign and for other
emergency-driven governmental measures. Like the GBS cases, the
U.K. contaminated blood cases suggest that government-driven emergent
health campaigns, which entwine products and prudential public health
judgments, are best seen not simply as product liability actions; but
rather as policy-driven governmental operations for which tort liability
principles are appropriately applied.
The British cases centered on the conduct of the public health
authorities. The action was brought not in common law negligence, but
under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, which implemented European
Union Council Directive (EEC) 85/374 (on the approximation of the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states
concerning liability for defective products). 1 5 Examining whether the
National Blood Authority 316 was to be held liable for tardiness in
implementing the recently available test for hepatitis C infection
contamination of donated blood, Burton tested the NBA's conduct in
light of the circumstances:
(I) Presentation, i.e. the way in which the product is presented, e.g.
warnings and price; (ii) The use to which the product could
reasonably be expected to be put, e.g.: (a) if the product is not a
familiar or usual one, such as a scrid, it will be necessary to find out
what its expected or foreseeable use is; (b) if it is expected and
required to be dangerous in respect of its expected use, e.g. a gun,
then complaint cannot be made of that dangerousness; but complaint
could still be made of a different dangerousness, such as if it
exploded on the trigger being pulled; and [c] if it is not expected to be
dangerous in respect of its expected use, but the use to which it is put
is unexpected, then it may not be defective; (iii) The time when the
product is circulated, for example when the product is out of date or
stale.
3 17
314. A and Others, at § 31 (emphasis added).
315. See A and others, 2.
316. The National Blood Authority is a public authority which oversees the collection
and deployment of blood resources through out the United Kingdom. Unlike 47 U.S.
states the U.K. has no blood-shield statute in the U.K. Ordinary principles of product
liability and consumer protection law apply to its activities.
317. A and Others, at § 31 (emphasis added).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Burton's approach fits the evaluation of liability in a policy-driven
national campaign such as the Swine Flu, smallpox, or future
government-led mass vaccination efforts campaign. In the Swine Flu
campaign, the urgency was to inoculate the entire population in time for
the winter flu season. Such an effort places a premium on preparation
and on wide public cooperation-like that achieved in 1947 when the
City Department of Health vaccinated six million New Yorkers in two
weeks. Presentation of the Swine Flu campaign was driven by the need
to achieve so-called "herd immunity." That concept sees each successful
vaccinee as an obstacle to spread of the disease.318  Maximization of
participation is a means of serving not only the individual but also of
protecting others. 319 A public good is served by each person who accepts
the risks of vaccination. The time factor limits the choices of products
for government to adopt and places a premium on individual assumption
of risk. It is inevitably the case in such circumstance that authorities will
be tempted to emphasize the individual benefits and de-emphasize the
burdens of vaccination, as we saw in Petty v. United States.
Judge Burton approached the problem in this way. Under the
Consumer Protection Act:
(t)he onus of proof is upon the claimants to prove the product to be
defective. (iv) The question to be resolved is the safety or the degree
or level of safety or safeness which persons generally are entitled to
expect. The test is not that of an absolute level of safety, nor an
absolute liability for any injury caused by the harmful characteristic.
(v) In the assessment of that question the expectation is that of
persons generally, or the public at large. (vi) The safety is not what is
actually expected by the public at large, but what they are entitled to
expect. The common ground is that the question is what the
legitimate expectation is of persons generally, i.e. what is legitimately
to be expected, arrived at objectively.... (vii) The court decides
what the public is entitled to expect. . . . Such objectively assessed
legitimate expectation may accord with actual expectation; but it may
be more than the public actually expects, thus imposing a higher
standard of safety, or it may be less than the public actually expects.
Alternatively the public may have no actual expectation-e.g. in
relation to a new product-the word coined in argument for such an
imaginary product was a 'scrid.' (viii) There are some products,
which have harmful characteristics in whole or in part, about which
no complaint can be made."
320
Judge Burton's approach to the government agency's tardy adoption
318. Arthur Allen, For the Good of the Herd, N.Y. Times, Op-Ed, January 25, 2007.
319. See generally PLOTKIN SA, MORTIMER EA, VACCINES (2d ed. 1994).
320. A and Others at § 31 (emphasis added).
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of a blood safety measure is compatible with our law. In such instances
the negligence standard of comment k retains vitality in our state product
liability law-and therefore remains the basis for liability against the
United States. Where risk is unavoidable the patient is entitled to make
an informed choice.
It is doubtless the case that individual freedom can be greatly
restricted for public health purposes. Many have urged strong
restatement of that authority, such as in the Model State Emergency
Health Preparedness Act, which emphasizes that even compulsory
vaccination may be necessary in certain circumstances.3 2 1 But in the
Swine Flu program, compulsion was not an element. The presentation of
the vaccination program - driven by the desire to vaccinate all-
understandably underscored the safety of the vaccine. But the limitations
of clinical trials left safety questions unanswered-a fact omitted from
the government's presentation to the public. Much more emphasized
was the need for vaccination and the low rate and minor nature of
complications-that only 2% of adults in trials developed a low grade
fever (<102' F) or other mild reaction-the same as those who received a
placebo. Newspapers embraced the message with an 88% editorial
322
approval rate for the campaign. Thus we see in both Petty and A and
others v. National Blood Authority the aptness of common law tort
principles expressed in statutory remedies when government is the actor
in public health measures such as stockpiling and distributing blood
products and vaccines.
VI. Recap-A Regressive Trend
Since the establishment of the September 11 Victims Compensation
Fund in the honeymoon period of national unity following the
catastrophe, the disaster has impelled no similar social insurance
measures. Immunity measures have sprouted but benefits extended have
been meager-such as for those who volunteered to receive the smallpox
vaccine and were taken ill. The countervailing impulse-to limit
liability, to immunize product manufacturers and others whose
negligence may cause injury-has made limited advances under the flag
of the need to induce the production of protective products and the
supply of services.
But the system retains enough stability that the basic structural
principles remain in place: the costs of injuries due to war and natural
disaster lie where they fall but wrongdoers-whether private or
governmental actors-are responsible for the harm done by their faulty
321. LAWRENCE A. GOSTIN, ET AL., JAMA (2002).
322. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 268, at 82-84.
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conduct in the circumstances. Emergency-actual or contemplated-has
been declared to require a shield from the principle of liability for
wrongful acts and omissions that have brought harm to others. Thus the
non-fault compensation of the September 11 Victims Compensation
Fund provided not immunity but an effective pressure release mechanism
for parties who foresaw the possibility of huge liability claims against
them - such as the airlines.
The impulse to grant immunity has been seen in the smallpox
vaccination campaign, specifically in the new rule announced by the
FDA declaring its support for preemption of state tort liability for drugs
marketed with approved labeling, and in the "declarations" authorized by
the Preparedness Act for marketing and use of vaccines, drugs, and
medical devices for prevention, mitigation, and cure of emergency or
epidemic injuries and illnesses. 323 [Of course an epidemic is just an
increase of disease beyond the normal-and it may present no
circumstance that justifies departure from the usual standards of care.]
We have also seen the effort of the defense in the Ground Zero
respiratory illness cases to win adoption of a broad measure of
emergency civil defense immunity from the claims of workers who
suffered respiratory injuries incurred during their work on the smoldering
ruins of the World Trade Center in New York City.
But we see too that the tort claims of those who opted out of the
September 11 fund, the federalized causes of action of the ground zero
cleanup workers-based on state substantive law, and the Federal Tort
Claims Act itself-are substantial bulwarks of tort law as it has been
commonly understood. We see in the Swine Flu experience the
importance of the FTCA as remedy for tortious governmental conduct-
particularly since the most contentious issues are likely to arise from the
mass distribution of relatively untested drugs and vaccines from the
national stockpiles established by the Bioshield Act of 2004.
The approach taken by the Congress in the Swine Flu Act of 1976
324affirms the system of civil recourse. That measure allowed actions
under the FTCA against the United States government itself, and
derivatively, standing in the place of manufacturers facing product
liability actions. The act provided that
323. See supra Section III B.
324. See Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he Swine
Flu Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113, originally codified as 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)
et seq.... established a national program of immunization for a disease popularly known
as swine flu. In order to induce private companies to manufacture the needed vaccine,
the United States stepped into the shoes of the manufacturer... and assumed all liability
for damages, incorporating as a remedy the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b).). The United States retained a right of subrogation in the event of
negligence by the manufacturers. The right was never exercised.
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the liability of the United States arising out of the act or omission of a
[Swine Flu Vaccine] program participant may be based on any theory
of liability that would govern an action against such program
participant under the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of
warranty."
325
So, since 9/11, we can identify a broad regressive trend:
1) The no fault victim compensation fund326 succeeded in resolving
the claims of almost all those who died or were injured in the 9/11
attacks and their immediate aftermath, 327 with only a handful
pursuing the optional tort remedy. But the Fund-a unique,
uncapped administrative measure governed by a benevolent
overseer 328 with a tort option was the first response. Other measures
with broad liability restrictions and even lower compensatory
components have followed.
2) The Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act provided
limited, secondary medical, disability, and death benefits to
volunteers who acted for public benefit.39 The death benefits are
patterned on (and are secondary to) the Public Service Officers
Benefits Program which pays benefits to families of policemen and
firefighters who die in the line of duty. 330 Congress rejected the
option of folding smallpox vaccine-related injuries in the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,331 a public health
measure which provides an apt model for the smallpox program
which was directed to gaining the cooperation of public health
volunteers.
3) "Tort reform" limits have been repeatedly embraced, rejecting the
objective of requiring wrongdoers to absorb the full cost of their
conduct, limiting damages to the available insurance coverage,
limiting joint and several liability, failing to provide attorneys fees
for prevailing claimants, and barring punitive damages.
4) Causes of action have been federalized and state remedies
preempted, as in the ATSSSA, the Safety Act, and the SEPPA which
325. Swine Flu Program Act, P.L. 94-380, 10 Stat 113, § 2 (1976).
326. ATSSA, supra note 23, at § 408.
327. 21 C.F.R. 104.2 (2007) (Eligibility Determination and Requirements).
328. DILLER, supra note 30, at 766-767.
329. P.L. 108-20 (2003) (42 U.S.C. § 239, et seq.); 42 C.F.R. 102.1, et seq.; Conk,
supra note 181.
330. 42 U.S.C. 3796, et seq. (2006).
331. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.
(2006).
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preempt state tort law.
5) Emergency acts have been deployed by litigants such as New
York City to gain immunity for certain actions. (E.g. SDEA, Stafford
Act)
6) Duties of ordinary care have been codified, providing defenses to
common law tort actions against medicine and medical device
manufacturers (e.g. Emergency Use Act 21 U.S.C. 354; 10 U.S.C.
1107; Project BioShield Act of 2004 - 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb-3)
7) Virtual immunity has been promised to the producers of products
to be deployed in case of disasters, epidemics and pandemics without
demonstration of any exigent circumstances justifying the departure
from ordinary care.
8) Industrial workers-the much lauded thousands of ground zero
clean-up workers with respiratory injury claims-have retained the
familiar remedies of the workers compensation, disability pension,
and tort systems. Although Congress created a $350 million captive
insurance company to defend and indemnify the City of New York,
workers have confronted contested workers compensation claims and
full scale all-out traditional tort defenses, including the not yet
resolved issues of state and federal emergency act immunities. But
those workers also have the benefit of the provision of the ATSSSA
which, though it preempted state remedies chose as the substantive
law that of New York State.
The lessons learned regarding worker health and safety are familiar
ones: there was inadequate preparation for the disaster-as public health
authorities had not established partnerships with agencies outside their
field such as police, fire, Coast Guard, and FBI. Such omissions -
remarkable because the World Trade Center had already been the target
of attack-lead to unclear lines of authority, poor risk communication,
inadequate protection of workers, lack of chemical exposure standards
for residents and workers, failures of building safety and evacuation, and
an absence of baseline data for health tracking of the impact of the
environmental disaster. 32 For such wrongs state tort law and the Federal
Tort Claims Act remain viable remedies and pillars of the system of civil
recourse for tortious injury.
332. See generally DAVID ROSNER AND GERALD MARKOWITZ, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE
SHIFTING PRIORITIES OF PUBLIC AND POPULATION HEALTH IN NEW YORK (2003).
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VII. Where Do We Go from Here? Civil Recourse and a Common
Vision of Tort Law
The idea that the civil law provides a remedy for wrongful injury by
one person to another is deeply embedded in our law and culture. The
principle has constitutional stature, as Prof. John Goldberg has recently
elucidated.333 The expectation is embedded both in the law of states, and
in federal law.
The right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, for example,
mandates that "every person, for an injury done him in his ... person,
* * * shall have remedy by due course of law., 334  In Louisiana, an
intermediate appellate court335 has declared that because of inflation
Louisiana's $500,000 medical malpractice damages cap has so
"depreciated" the value of that sum that it violates the state constitution's
guarantee of an "adequate remedy" at law.336 In Amendment VII, the
United States Constitution preserves the right to jury trial shall be
preserved in all "suits at common law" in matters in controversy in
excess of $20.33' The concept of due process is broad enough, Goldberg
suggests, to encompass the right of civil recourse-to take from a
wrongdoer that which fairly recompenses the harm done.
338
William Blackstone's elaboration of the uncodified constitution of
English law acknowledges as foundational the customary expectations of
Englishmen, a sense of rights, wrongs, and remedies.339  If we
acknowledge that our common law heritage similarly informs our
foundational law, we can say with Blackstone:
In vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if
there were no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when
wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly
333. See infra note 354.
334. OHIOCONST. art. 1 §16(1803).
335. State of Lo./Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, 2006 La. App. LEXIS 2164
(2006).
336. LA. CONST. art 1, § 22 (1974) (providing: "All courts shall be open, and every
person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property,
reputation, or other rights.").
337. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.").
338. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524 (2006).
339. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1976)
passim.
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when we speak of the protection of the law.
3 40
September 11, 2001 saw the first attack on our capital since the
British burned Washington. The emotional impact of the towers' fall and
the Pentagon burning may have exceeded Pearl Harbor's. The
acceptance of the hyperbolic labeling of the site as Ground Zero conveys
the message that 9/11 was a shock that like Pearl Harbor could trigger
both solidarity and vengeance. We realized in shock that stepping from
the subway to the elevator could be the occasion for the deaths of
ourselves and thousands out of the clear blue. Many have asked if
traditional constitutional protections need to be modified permitting, for
example, warrantless surveillance outside the bounds of current law, or
even an emergency constitution recognized. And, unfortunately, many
have seen in the catastrophe reason to erode the fundamental principles
of responsibility for which the law of torts stands. To stay that course
would, I think, be gravely mistaken.
It is almost breath-taking to read, as in the Swine Flu Act and S.
2291, that the United States government accepts responsibility for tort
claims based on "under the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, including negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of
warranty., 34 1 We have come to expect instead broad measures to
federalize and shrivel tort law like H. R. 5 which passed the House of
Representatives in 2005.342 The bill is a catalog of the "tort reform
agenda"-caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, limits on counsel
fees, elimination of joint and several liability, periodic rather than lump
sum payment of damages, and the like in medical malpractice and
medical product liability cases.
Such anti-tort thrusts and historic anti-tort measures proceed on the
assumption that provision of needed products and services is obstructed
by tort liability for products like vaccine, blood, and biologics that
respond to emergencies or are "unavoidably dangerous." Some argue
that drugs as a class are different and cannot be competently handled by
340. Id. at 55-56.
341. Swine Flu Act supra note 325, at § (2)(A)(i).
342. Congressional Research Service , Report to Congress, H.R. 5, 109th Congress,
RS22054- January 18, 2006. The measure, which the House passed without amendment
on July 28, 2005, "would preempt state law regarding some aspects of medical
malpractice liability, and liability for defective medical products, including drugs. It
would not, however, preempt any state law that imposes greater procedural or substantive
protections for health care providers and health care organizations from liability. In
medical malpractice and defective medical products suits, H.R. 5 would, among other
things, place caps on noneconomic and punitive damages (but only in states that have not
enacted and do not enact caps), eliminate joint and several liability, modify the collateral
source rule, limit lawyers' contingent fees, enact a federal statute of limitations, and
provide for periodic payment of future damages."
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ordinary principles of tort law. 343 Others proceed on the basis of urban
myths of out of control juries and courts that have been shown to have no
basis in fact, as both Professor Thomas Baker and the Rand Institute for
Civil Justice have shown decisively regarding one of the favorite
targets-medical malpractice claims.
344
It is my argument that tort law needs revitalization and that the
revival should be on the basis of traditional doctrinal principles, not on
the basis that tort law is a form of "social engineering," as William
Prosser once put it;34 5 a means to address the social problem of the costs
of accidents, as Guido Calabresi famously put it;34 6 or to achieve efficient
wealth-maximizing results through cost-benefit analysis, as Richard
Posner and his Benthamite apostles have urged.347 Nor is the law of torts
a way to fill in the gaps in our social welfare system, or to discipline
corporate barons who slight safety-though it may serve those goals.348
Rather, tort law should be recognized as a guarantee of the principle
of responsibility for one's actions. Determination of liability in tort is a
valuable measure and means of achieving civility in civil society. As
Professor Stephen Sugarman has recently observed-American liberals
343. See Aaron D. Twerski and James A. Henderson, Jr., Drugs Are Different, 111
YALE L.J. 151 (2001); George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for
Drugs and Medical Devices, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737 (2002).
344. See generally THOMAS BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005) (Few
victims of medical malpractice bring lawsuits. The system is not in crisis due to jury
verdicts but would benefit from structural reform of the malpractice insurance industry);
NICHOLAS PACE, ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TRIALS, CALIFORNIA VERDICTS UNDER MICRA (2004) (caps on non-economic damages
have reduced awards to plaintiffs by 30% with the heaviest burden falling on the most
seriously injured).
345. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS (2d. ed.) (1955) (§ 3 Social
Engineering "The law of torts is concerned primarily with the adjustment of the
conflicting interests of individuals to achieve a desirable social result ... both for the
present and for the future." § 4 Factors affecting tort liability include not only "the
weight attached to the particular interest" but also by "other considerations" including
"the moral aspects of the defendant's conduct," the "historical development of the law,"
the "difficulty" of administering the proposed rule, and "possible prevention of future
torts").
346. See genereally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (strict
enterprise liability can reduce the social cost of accidental injury).
347. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972)
("The ordinary negligence rule is designed to encourage actors to act only when the
benefits outweigh the costs. Ordinarily, the threat of liability will deter a person from
acting if the costs outweigh the benefits because the actor will be forced to pay those
costs in a lawsuit; if the benefits outweigh the costs, the actor will proceed knowing that
it will not be held liable and will enjoy the benefits. As a result, the optimal outcome is
achieved.") (citing Snyder v. American Association of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 310
(1995) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)).
348. CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAW SUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA passim (2004)
(product liability lawsuits provide a form of corporate discipline).
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have done a flip-flop. Longtime critics of tort and proponents of
sociological explanations and structural solutions rather than advocates
of punitive measures to control conduct, liberals have become tort's
leading defenders. In it they find comfort in the doctrinal principle of
personal responsibility for wrongdoing, while conservative critics lodge
grievances against the system for inefficiency and randomness and
unpredictability. 349 There lies the seed of resolution of the tort wars of
recent years. Focus on doctrinal principles reunites liability rules and
remedies.
The thrust of tort reform has not been an attack on principles of
personal responsibility, but instead has focused on reducing the costs to
repeat players in the system-manufacturers, medical practitioners,
liability insurers, government, and the like. 350  But as the Louisiana
appellate court declares in Arrington v. ER Physicians, erosion of
remedies can undermine their constitutionally required substance: the
provision by government of an adequate remedy for those injured by the
wrongful acts of others.35'
Switching the focus of the tort debate from cost reduction and
corporate governance to principles of personal responsibility clarifies the
principles and remedies for which we stand. Tort law, along with the
right of action by an injured person against a wrongdoer, strengthens the
bonds of civility among citizens and between government and citizens.
Tort's broad reach expresses not a culture of irresponsibility but rather of
accountability, in which all actors are governed by a equivalent standards
of conduct, care dictated by capability and circumstance. When
responsibility principles are identified as central, we may find greater
receptiveness among legislators, and greater judicial willingness to reject
arbitrary legislated limits on actions and on remedies. We see support
for this in the many state court decisions which have invalidated state
damages caps.352
349. Stephen D. Sugarman, Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals Are Now the
Primary Supporters of Tort Law (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/
abstract-925244.
350. See BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS, supra note 28.
351. Arrington v. ER Physicians, 2006 La. App. LEXIS 2164 (Inflation has eroded
value of $500,000 cap on medical malpractice damages from $500,000 to $160,000.
Court voids legislative damages cap because the Supreme Court has said that the
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act must be strictly construed because it grants
advantages to special classes in derogation of some rights available to tort victims, and
the Louisiana Constitution provides: Article 1, § 22. All courts shall be open, and every
person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property,
reputation, or other rights.).
352. Arrington, supra note, at 335 (citing cases in other jurisdictions striking damages
caps).
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In recent years, two scholars, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky, have elaborated the principle that tort law should be
understood not as social engineering,35 3 and not as corrective justice
(though they are close to that view), but as a system of civil recourse.
354
By that they mean that torts is about what it appears to be, the exercise of
a personal right of action by one who has suffered harm against the
wrongdoer who inflicted the harm. Tort law is based on fundamental
principles of responsibility familiar across continents and time.
Thus, William Blackstone wrote that "wherever the common law
gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action, and
therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a new method or remedy must
be pursued., 355 And the current draft of the revised civil code of the
Peoples Republic of China begins, "One who through his fault causes
bodily injury or damage to the property of another shall bear tort
liability., 35 6 Measures that grant immunity for faulty conduct run not
only against the grain of our tradition, but against the basic principles of
civil society which we rightly urge upon others.
Statutory codification can serve the principle well where a statute
specifies a guidance rule. A recent example is the enactment of
procedures for FDA authorization of emergency use of medicines still
under development. That measure comports with the fundamental
principle that each of us owes others whom our activities may harm the
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. 357 But broad pseudo-
emergency provisions like those of the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act of 2005 do not.
353. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEORGETOWN L.J. 513
(2003).
354. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998) ("In a civilized society, we are not permitted to "get even"-we
are entitled to a private right of action in place of getting even .... A private right of
action against another person is essentially a response to having been legally wronged by
that person, and therefore exists only where the defendant has committed a legal wrong
against the plaintiff and thus violated her legal right.").
355. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OF
PRIVATE WRONGS, 123 (1768).
356. Civil Code of the Peoples Republic of China, Ch. 8, art. I (draft of December 17,
2002), 10 Si FA (PRIVATE LAW REVIEW) 277 (2005), trans. George W. Conk.
357. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2006) (The Secretary of Health may authorize emergency
use of a drug if she finds .... ).

